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THE FNMA/FHLMC UNIFORM HOME
IMPROVEMENT LOAN NOTE: THE
SECONDARY MARKET MEETS THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT
PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR.t
In this Article Professor Randolph explores the implications of the
language used in the new uniform Home Improvement Loan Note that
is required by the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. The signftcance of the uni-
form instrument extends beyond transactions with either the FNMA or
the FHLMC; the instrument is in fact likely to become the '7ndustry
standard" within a short time. Professor Randolph hasprovidedan ex-
tensive analysis of the instrument, one which should prove valuable to
courts andpractitioners alike. Professor Randolph examines the HIL
note in light of North Carolina law in thefinal section of the Arile. In
conclusion Professor Randolph argues that the un!form HIL note will
be a welcome addition to the field
As inflated interest rates and prices continue to bar American homeown-
ers from relocating to the "home of their dreams," many may seek to realize
some-of those dreams by remodeling their existing houses. Money for such
remodeling will also be expensive, but remodelers at least can continue to ben-
efit from existing lower interest fixed payment loans that they undertook when
they purchased their homes.' Because of the existence of first lien mortgages
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri, Kansas City. The author undertook
basic research for this Article while serving as scholar-in-residence for the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation. The author is especially grateful for the advice and counsel of James
Vaughter and Gary Smuckler, both of the Washington, D.C. Bar. He also is indebted to James
Spencer, of the Missouri Bar, and Keith Seat, a student at the University of Missouri-Kansas City
Law School, for able research assistance. The views expressed are those of the author and in no
sense represent positions of the Mortgage Corporation or the individuals credited here.
1. Due to the recent frantic escalation of mortgage interest rates, homeowners who bought
houses as recently as one year ago would be unable to afford to buy the same home today. In fact,
today's home loan industry has abandoned, perhaps permanently, the 30-year, fixed rate mortgage
that has been the market staple for the past 45 years. Today's mortgage rates include provisions
which permit increases iq rates as the cost of money grows. See, e.g., Adjustable Mortgage Loan
Instruments, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545). Even these "wide
open" mortgage terms may be superseded by short term "balloon" loans or loans whose principal
amount grows, rather than reduces, over time. See Balloon Payment Mortgage Loans and Re-
verse Annuity Mortgage Loans, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,714 (1981) (proposed rule).
Homeowners fortunate enough to have avoided today's "creative financing" quagmire may
enjoy their good fortune only so long as they keep their present homes. Most home mortgages
written in the last ten years include some form of "due on sale" clause, which gives lenders the
right to terminate existing interest rate arrangements when the property is sold. Although a few
states have restricted state chartered lenders from using the clause to raise interest rates, most of
the recent decisions have upheld the clause. See Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement of Due-On-
Transfer Clauses: An Update, 16 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 291 (1981); Randolph, The
e FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Home Improvement Loan Instruments, A Commentary and Critique,
16 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 546 (1981). Further, the current weight of authority recognizes
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or deeds of trust which secure these earlier purchase money loans, however,
potential home remodelers may find that lenders are unwilling to take the risk
of lending substantial amounts secured by junior security positions,2 even
when the purpose is to improve the security. If lenders are willing to take such
risks, they may do so only at interest rates or terms substantially more onerous
than those available for first lien loans.
To the aid of such hapless homeowners have come the two central charac-
ters in the formerly booming money market for the first lien purchase money
loans: the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Mortgage Corporation or Corporation).
3
federal savings and loan associations, by far the largest single source of conventional home
purchase loans, as exempt from state law regulation of due-on-sale clause enforcement. Dunn &
Nowinski, supra, at 292-300. A few recent cases have cast some doubt upon this issue. See De la
Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467, pet. denied,
- Cal. 3d -, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. -, appeal docketed, No. 81-750 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1981);
Panko v. Pan Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Cal. App. 3d_, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981); Holiday
Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a relatively early opinion in the due-on-sale contro-
versy, upheld the validity of the clause under most circumstances. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620,224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), noted in 55 N.C.L. Rev. 310 (1977) and 13 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 490 (1977).
2. Moragees with a junior priority status often find themselves in a delicate position when
the borrower defaults on a senior lien. Since they are secured only by the surplus available after
foreclosure of prior liens, such mortgagees are much more affected by a slight depreciation in the
value of the security, a phenomenon which often accompanies the financial embarrassment of the
borrower. In order to protect their position, such junior mortgagees often must postpone the se-
nior lien foreclosure or pay off the senior lien (becoming subrogated to it). See G. Osborne, 0.
Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law §§ 7.2-.5, at 426-35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Osborne & Nelson]. The junior mortgagee must evaluate its options and produce the necessary
funds to protect itself in a relatively short period of time and in the shadow of the encroaching
senior foreclosure.
In light of the special risks of junior priority, it is not surprising that home improvement
lenders traditionally have been specialists, equippe to evaluate the risks inherent in their security
and to respond when these risks become real dangers. These "specialists" have included some
commercial banks and savings and loan associations, but have also included a variety of mortgage
bankers and consumer loan specialists. The market for home improvement loan money, then, has
tended to bear little relationship to that for home purchase loan money. Although conditions
have varied, home improvement loans in excess of $10,000 have been rare, maximum terms have
tended to range from 6 to 10 years, and interest rates have been considerably higher than purchase
money first lien loans.
3. FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation are distinct entities with different organizational
structures and business approaches, although they perform a similar function in purchasing home
mortgages. Their present role in the conventional mortgage market began with the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 stat. 450 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which implemented a plan to establish a secondary market for
conventional mortgages, primarily first lien mortgages on single-family homes. The Act gave
FNMA the authority to buy onventional mortgages from mortgage ompanies, commercial and
savings banks, savings and loan associations and a variety of other sellers. The newly created
Mortgage Corporation, on the other hand, was restricted generally to purchasing from federally
chartered or insured savings and loan associations, federally insured banks, the Federal Home
Loan Banks themselves, Federal Savings and Loan Corporation (FSLIC), and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). FNMA traditionally has been most active in purchasing loans
from mortgage bankers or other loan originators that are not primarily dependent on savings. In
addition to buying conventional mortgages, FNMA has continued in its role as the major seon-
dary market purchaser of VA and FRHA insured loans. The Mortgage CorOration, with mor
limited scope of authority but a close relationship with the federally charterYand insured savings
and loans who make up the Federal Home Loan Banking System, has purchased the bulk of its
loans from these savings and loan associations. See Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, § 4.3, at 660.
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Over the past two decades, using money drawn from capital rich sectors of the
economy, these organizations have fueled the money market for conventional
purchase money loans by purchasing such loans from originating lenders.
4
Although other "secondary market makers" have appeared in recent years,
FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation continue to dominate the secondary
market for home loans. Now, after painstaking market research and a lengthy
development process, both organizations have announced programs5 to ac-
quire home improvement loans-in most cases loans secured by more risky
second or third lien security instruments on owner occupied homes. These
purchase programs will increase the money supply for such loans, and the loan
amounts and payment schedule of permissible loans under the programs likely
will be more attractive than those currently available.
6
A key element in all FNMA and Mortgage Corporation purchase pro-
grams is the requirement that originating lenders use the uniform note and
mortgage or deed of trust forms that FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation
developed jointly. Thus when FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation resolved
to prepare programs for the purchase of Home Improvement Loans (HILs),
one of their first projects was the development of a uniform note and deed of
trust or mortgage instrument that would provide adequate security in every
state, be attractive to traditional home improvement lenders and respond to
In 1978, Congress extended the market areas of the Mortgage Corporation, giving it authority to
purchase mortgages from mortgage bankers and other sources traditionally reserved to FNMA.
Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 321(b), 92 Stat. 2080 (1979) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1454(a)(1) (Supp. El 1979)).
FNMA is a federally chartered private corporation whose stock is traded publicly. Osborne
& Nelson, supra note 2, § 11.3, at 659. Itsprimary source of outside funds for its mortgage
purchase activity has been debt financing. Icd at 660. The Mortgage Corporation is an income
tax-exempt corporation owned by the Federal Home Loan Banks. Id. It has both private and
public features and legally is categorized as a corporate instrumentality of the United States. See
id. Its primary source of funds is its sale of "mortgage pass through" securities of various types.
See id., §§ 5.35, 11.3, at 363, 661; Sivesind, Mortgage-Backed Securities, The Revolution in Real
Estate Finance, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Rev., Autumn 1979, at 1-10. These securities transfer an
ownership interest in mortgages purchased and packaged for resale by the Mortgage Corporation,
which additionally guarantees principal and interest payments. Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2,
§ 11.3, at 661.
Recently, both organizations have been considering structural changes that will broaden their
activities and make each more like the other. See [1981] 8 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 661; [1981]
9 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 197.
4. See Osborne & Nelson, supra note 3, § 11.3, at 658-59. In most cases, originating lenders
continue to "service" loans sold on the secondary market. Id. § 11.1, at 640. Borrowers typically
are unaware that their mortgage loan has been sold.
5. See generally Randolph, supra note 1, at 547 n.2, 551-60. FNMA has developed plans for
a program. 11981] 8 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 865. The FNMA program had not been imple-
mented as of this writing because FNMA has elected to use variable interest rate provisions in lieu
of the fixed rate provisions in the Note form discussed herein, and is still in the process of drafting
these provisions. Id. There is some likelihood that both FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation
will expand their junior lien programs by early 1982 to include junior lien loans for purposes other
than home improvement. FNMA has approved plans to buy junior lien loans secured by proper-
ties in which it also holds the senior lien position. [1981] 8 Hous. & Dev. L. Rep. (BNA) 782.
6. The Mortgage Corporation's current program includes Home Improvement Loans
(HILs) with maximums of $60,000 for two-to-four family homes (owner occupied), $40,000 for
single family homes and $15,000 for condominium units. Maximum terms will run to 20 years for
loans of more than $30,000, or 15 years for smaller loans. Interest rates have hovered around 17%,
about one point higher than the market price for fixed-rate, first-lien loans.
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the varying customs and legal requirements in each jurisdiction.7
Other secondary market purchasers, recognizing the value of having uni-
form instruments in evaluating risks and remarketing loans they purchase,
also customarily require that FNMA/Mortgage Corporation uniform instru-
ments be used in loans they buy. Because originating lenders desire the flex-
ibility of being able to place loans on the secondary market, and because the
uniform instruments themselves are of excellent quality, many lenders custom-
arily use the uniform instruments in all their loan transactions. The drafters of
the HIL instruments, therefore, were aware that their product might well be-
come the "industry standard" within a short time.8
Perhaps the most significant obstacle facing the drafting team was that in
many jurisdictions home improvement loans, unlike purchase money home
loans, are regarded as "consumer loans," subject to the complex and demand-
ing consumer protection statutes developed by state legislatures in response to
the abuses in the consumer credit industry in recent decades. Although many
consumer credit abuses occurred in credit sales outside the home improvement
industry, such as in sales of furniture and automobiles, and in various door to
door solicitations, there can be no denying that the siding, storm window,
home insulation and other home improvement contractors have earned their
share of just criticism for harsh credit practices. In most states consumer pro-
tection laws have been clearly drawn to apply to home improvement loans,
and the drafters were forced to find ways to develop a marketable program
with uniform language that nevertheless responded to these restrictive con-
sumer protection provisions.
This Article outlines the drafters' response to these challenges in the de-
velopment of the uniform HIL note. The descriptive portions of the Article
contain exhaustive historical analysis: the author's objective was to provide all
information available about the reasons the drafters used the language they
did. If the HIL instruments achieve the prominence of the FNMA/FHLMC
first lien purchase money instruments, this historical data may prove helpful to
practitioners or courts in dealing with the many problems of application which
will arise. In the short run, of course, the close descriptive analysis will be of
benefit primarily to practitioners advising lenders who are considering using
the HIL instruments in a home improvement lending program. There is par-
ticular emphasis on the Mortgage Corporation's HIL program, the only pro-
gram actually functioning when the Article was completed. There are
frequent references to the basic contract documents affecting the program-
the Sellers' and Servicers' Manuals. 9
7. For a detailed discussion of the drafting objectives and the tactics used to achieve them,
see Randolph, supra note 1, at 555-59.
8. FHLMC analysts estimate that 80% of the conventional first lien mortgage loans in 1980
were written on the FNMA/FHLMC uniform instrument forms. Due to the current proliferation
of "creative financing" interest provisions, the impact of the first lien forms likely will decline, at
least until practices again become more standard. Secondary market considerations continue to
press the need for uniformity. See, e.g., [1981] 8 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 747 (comments of a
representative of the Mortgage Bankers Association).
9. These publications are available to persons eligible to sell loans tW the Mortgage Corpo-
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The evaluative aspects of the Article provide a commentary on the ac-
ceptability of the instruments as consumer lending tools. The author believes
that FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation must recognize the significance of
their drafting decisions on prevailing lending practices, and must attempt,
within practical limits, to acheive as much fairness to the borrower as is consis-
tent with adequate protection for the lender.
The Article is based upon research undertaken by the author in the files
of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and its counsel during the
summer of 1980. The author enjoyed less access to drafters representing
FNMA but did have complete freedom to explore the written record of the
joint drafting enterprise. This Article discusses issues primarily relating to the
HIL note instrument alone. A companion article, providing a similar descrip-
tive and evaluative approach to the mortgage and deed of trust instruments,
has been published elsewhere.10
I. "PLAIN LANGUAGE" DRAFrING
An important difference between the uniform HIL Note form11 and the
first lien note 12 is apparent immediately. The HIL Note is written in "plain
language."1 3 Only five jurisdictions presently have statutes in effect requiring
that consumer instruments be written in "plain language."1 4 The first "plain
language" statute, New York's, specifically exempts the FNMA/FHLMC in-
ration. They constitute a part of the contract of sale. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,
Home Improvement Loan Sellers' Manual 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sellers' Manual]; Ran-
dolph, supra note 1, at 554. Those participating in the program should be aware particularly of
the warranty contained in Sellers' Manual § 1.102s, to the effect that all federal, state and local
laws, including any consumer disclosure laws, have been complied with. Thus, the Seller, not the
Mortgage Corporation, bears the ultimate responsibility to establish that the HIL uniform instru-
ments conform to laws affecting that Seller's business.
10. Randolph, supra note 1. That Article contains considerably more detail about the Mort-
gage Corporation's HIL program as well as a discussion of each major covenant in the Mort-
gage/Deed of Trust instrument itself.
11. See North Carolina Uniform Note Instrument, infra Appendix A [hereinafter cited as
N.C. Note].
12. FNMA/FHLMC Uniform First Lien Note Instrument (copy on file in N.C.L. Rev. of-
fice) [hereinafter cited as First Lien Note].
13. For a summary of the drafting techniques used in the development of the uniform first
lien "plain language" instruments, see Browne, Development of the FNMA/FHLMC Plain Lan-
guage Mortgage Documents-Some Useful Techniques, 14 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 696 (1979).
See generally Kellogg, A Plan for Drafting in Plain English, Cal. St. B.J. 154 (1981); Plack, The
Plain Language Movement: An Overview with Recent Developments, 36 J. Mo. B. 40 (1980).
14. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-151 through -158 (West Supp. 1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
,§ 487A-1 through -3 (Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 1121 through 26 (1980); N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 56:12-I through -13 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-702 (McKinney
Supp. 1980).
The Connecticut statute contains quite precise guidelines for "plain language" drafting, in-
cuding: maximum average words per sentence (21), maximum sentence length (50 words), aver-
age syllables per word (1.55), and length restrictions on longest and average paragraph. Id. The
requirements, however, are "sftened" somewhat by the "substantial compliance" provisions ofConn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-152 (West Supp. 1980). In several instances, the HIL Note does notprecisely comply with the Connecticut requirements, but the drafters souht substantial compli-
ance. Of course, rigid guidelines for "plain language" drafting in each junsdiction would destroythe uniformity goa of the FNMA/FHLMC enterprise.
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struments from its requirements. 15 Nevertheless, FNMA and the Mortgage
Corporation voluntarily complied with the New York statute and used "plain
language" instruments in the single family first lien program in that state. 16
The HIL Note is modeled after the New York first lien note. Changes were
made to suit the special requirements of a junior lien instrument. The drafters
of the New York first lien note had no intention of altering in any way the
substantive rights created by the first lien uniform note language used in other
jurisdictions. Obviously, the HIL Note should be interpreted in the same
manner.
The drafters did not write the HIL Mortgage 17 in "plain language" be-
cause of the concern that such a document would have far exceeded the length
restrictions they had established. The New York "plain language" HIL Mort-
gage, for instance, is eight pages long in contrast to the four-page uniform
instrument. Connecticut's statute exempts such security instruments from its
requirements.18 Others do not.
II. HL NOTE PARAGRAPH 1: BoRRowER's PROMISE TO PAY 19
Consistent with industry practice, the drafters used two basic instruments:
a negotiable note and a separate mortgage setting forth the real estate security.
The drafters have taken special care throughout the documentation to insure
that the benefits of negotiability are preserved wherever possible. This prac-
tice will be of scant significance in the Corporation's HIL pilot program, since
the Corporation will buy only participations and will buy only from originat-
ing lenders. Since the HIL forms quite possibly will be used later by FNMA
or the Corporation for whole loan purchases in subsequent programs, or by
lenders who sell to other secondary market purchasers, the Article will discuss
the negotiability provisions in the instruments.
Preservation of the benefits of negotiability is a difficult task in a home
improvement loan program. The FTC has adopted regulations20 that require
that a consumer borrower's claims and defenses against a contractor be avail-
able against any assignees of the debt instrument. The regulations require that
the debt instrument in such cases contain a legend appraising assignees that
the borrower's claims and defenses remain available, thus making it impossi-
ble for assignees to become holders in due course. These regulations are
aimed primarily at debts arising from an original contract between the con-
tractor and the homeowner, rather than from independent loans made by a
15. N.Y. Gen Oblig. Law § 5-702a2 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
16. See Browne, supra note 13, at 698.
17. See North Carolina Uniform Deed of Trust Instrument, infra Appendix B [hereinafter
cited as N.C. Deed of Trust].
18. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-156 (West Supp. 1980).
19. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 1.
20. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1981). The Federal
Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Rule took effect on May 14, 1976. 40 Fed. Reg.
53,506 (1975). Section 433 by its terms applies to financing of the cost of "&oods and services" and
does not apply to purchase money loans for acquisition of the property itself. See alsod note 31
infra.
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lending institution. Since the pilot HIL program will not involve contractor
paper,21 the uniform documents do not include the required FTC legend. The
regulations are nevertheless broad enough to require the legend when certain
affiliations exist between the contractor and the lender,2 and under the
Seller's Manual sellers are permitted to amend the uniform note instrument to
include the FTC legend when appropriate.23
Even when the FTC regulations do not apply, various forms of state con-
sumer regulation24 restrict the assignability of consumer paper. There is par-
ticular bmphasis placed upon the preservation of the defenses of the
homeowner rising from inadequate performance of the home improvement
contract.2 In some cases these statutes also turn on an "affiliation" between
the lender and contractor.26 In other cases, there is an absolute prohibition
21. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at § 1.102i.
22. The "affiliation" necessary to fall within the rule consists of common control ownership
between cohtractor and lender or else "any understanding, procedure, course of dealing or ar-
rangement, formal or informal between a [lender] and [contractor] in connection with the sale of
goods or services to consumers or the financing thereof." 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1(d), (g), (1), .2b. Pres-
ervation of Consumer's Claims and Defenses, Statement of Enforcement Policy on Trade Regula-
tion Rule, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,594 (1976). The burden of enforcement falls upon the contractor, not
the lender. The regulations make it an unfair trade practice for the contractor to accept the pro-
ceeds of a loan which violates the requirement Comments received after circulation of the HIL
exposure drafts, however, indicated that many lenders uniformly have included the FTC legend
on all their consumer loan note instruments.
23. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at Exhibit 18c, at 75.
24. E.g., the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.), which has been adopted in some
form in eleven states, restricts the negotiability of consumer paper in some circumstances. The
original version of the U.C.C.C. was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1968, and has been adopted, with a variety of
modifications, in seven states. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 5-1-101 to -12-105 (1973 & Supp. 1978);
Idaho Code §§ 28-31-101 to -39-108 (1980); Ind. Code §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to -6-203 (1976); Okla. Stat.
tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1971); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-1-101 to -9-103 (1980); Wis. Stat. §§
421.101 to 428.106 (1979); Wyo. Stat. §§ 40-14-101 to -702 (1972). A new version of the U.C.C.C.
was adopted by the National Conference in 1974 and by the American Bar Association in 1975.
This version has been adopted in three states. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 537.1101-.7103 (West Supp.
1980); Kan. Stat Ann. §§ 16a-1-101 to -9-102 (1974); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, §§ 1.101 to
7.127 (West Supp. 1980). South Carolina's Consumer Protection Code, S.C. Code §§ 37-1-101 to -
9-102 (1976 & Supp. 1980), is based on a combination of the 1969 and 1974 versions of the
U.C.C.C.
Individual states' limitations on the holder in due course doctrine are referred to in Osborne
& Nelson, supra note 2, § 5.30, at 327-28.
25. The usual statutory approach is to prohibit the use of negotiable instruments in seller-
financed consumer transactions. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C (West Supp. 1980);
Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.307. Another approach is to make the assignee or holder of
an instrument subject to the borrower's defenses in some circumstances. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1804.2(a) (West Supp. 1980); Mo. Rev. Stat § 408.405 (1979).
Some statutes permit the consumer to cut off the holder in due course status if the consumer
gives the assignee or holder proper notification of the consumer's defenses within the period pre-
scribed in the statute. E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1317.031 (Page 1979).
26. When a direct loan rather than seller financing is involved, the use of negotiable instru-
ments is not prohibited, but the consumer may be allowed to assert defenses against the holder if
the consumer can show a close relationship between the seller and the lender. See Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code § 3.405. The 1968 version of the U.C.C.C. prohibited negotiable consumer
paper only if the deal was seller financed. This section of the 1974 version makes the direct loan
lender subject to the consumer's defenses if there is a close relationship between the lender and the
seller and the lender either acts in a manner or receives benefits of a kind that ties the lender
closely to the particular sale transaction. See also Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 422.406 to -.408 (West 1974),
which provides that a lender in an "interlocking" consumer loan may be subject to the claims and
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upon certain aspects of negotiability.27 Some of these statutes28 would permit
consumer defenses against the note only when the note is in the hands of the
lender, while others29 would also affect the note as it passes through the hands
of subsequent purchasers, such as the Mortgage Corporation. Finally, case
law30 in certain states, like the FTC rule, restricts holder in due course status
when an affiliation exists between contractor and lender.
The FTC is proposing more extensive holder in due course regulations,
which may require another form of response in the uniform instruments.
3 1
The status of these proposed regulations remains uncertain, although it is pos-
sible they will become effective even before this article is published. Included
in these proposed regulations is a requirement that the preservation of defense
language be included in consumer loan instruments whenever the loan pro-
ceeds will pay for consumer goods and services, even when there is no "affilia-
tion" between the lender and the contractor supplying the goods and services.
Pending the FTC's action, the uniform instruments continue to be drafted to
preserve negotiability. Notwithstanding the extensive warranties32 it will ob-
tain from sellers, the Corporation continues to rely upon negotiability because
the status of holder in due course of a negotiable instrument gives different
protection and may insulate the secondary market buyers when warranties fail
due to financial distress of the warrantor. Certain forms of borrower defenses
likely would occur, if at all, throughout the portfolio of the particular lender or
group of lenders. For instance, the lender might have originated a large
number of loans relating to a home improvement program by a particularly
defenses of the consumer. An "interlocking relationship" may arise, inter alia, if the lender is
aware that the contractor sometimes fails to perform his contracts.
27. See note 25 supra; see generally Hudak and Carter, The Erosion of the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine: Historical Perspective and Development-Part II, 9 U.C.C.LJ. 235 (1977)
(summarizing holder in due course legislation in each of the states).
28. Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.405 subjects the lender who is closely related to the
seller to the consumer's defenses, but nothing prevents that lender from selling to a holder in due
course. The same result obtains under Wisconsin's "interlocking" loan statute, Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 422.408 (West 1974).
29. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.410(l) (1979), the consumer's defenses are preserved if the
seller arranged the loan. Unlike Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 3.405, which subjects only the
"closely related" lender to the consumer's defenses, the Missouri statute makes all holders or
assignees of the instrument subject to the consumer's defenses if the loan was arranged by the
seller. Arizona has similar legislation in this area, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-145 (West Supp.
1980).
30. See, e.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Armetta v. Cleve-
trust Realty Investors, 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 879 (Fla.
1979).
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,771 (1979). The amendment would extend the rule's application to credi-
tors who finance purchases of goods or services. On September 21, 1979, the Commission ap-
proved in substance the proposed amendment and decided to make a number of changes in the
text of the rule. Id. Comments on the drafting of the language changes were to be accepted
through January 14, 1980, after which the amendment was to be promulgated and an effective
date set. As of June 1981 this amendment is still pending; the Commission has taken no action,
although it was scheduled to consider the proposals in March 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 10,502 (1981).
32. The Seller must warrant that the HIL is a valid lien, fully enforceable, free of any right of
setoff or counterclaim or other claim or defense, Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at § 1.102q; that all
applicable requirements of federal, state and local laws, including truth in lending, consumer
lending and usury have been met, and any rescission period has expired, id. § 1.102s; that the total
loan balance has been advanced, id. § 1.102r, and that all construction is complete, id. § 1.102j.
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large contractor who has engaged in a uniform financing or construction prac-
tice that later has led to a large number of consumer complaints. Perhaps even
more dangerous would be a lender's misinterpretation of certain provisions of
the local usury laws. Again, such misinterpretation could be common among
lenders in a particular geographical area. In many jurisdictions, violation of
usury laws can lead to sanctions that diminish or destroy the lender's antici-
pated return beyond the amount attributable to usury. When consumer de-
fenses lead to major losses on a large number of loans originated by a
particular lender, that lender's financial position could be so adversely affected
that it might not be able to meet its obligations under its "repurchase" warran-
ties on those loans it had sold in the secondary market.
33
In many jurisdictions some consumer defenses arising from the construc-
tion project will "pass through" regardless of the attempt in the instruments to
make the assignee a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. 34 It is
nevertheless possible that language purporting to make the HIL notes negotia-
ble would protect holders in due course from defenses unrelated to the con-
struction.35 Again, the best example would be the usury problem. Depending
upon the nature of the usury violation, a secondary market purchaser could
acquire the obligation in good faith without actual knowledge that the interest
return was too high. Assuming that for reasons discussed above the note is
still subject to certain defenses that the borrower has against the contractor,
the note purchaser can argue that it still is insulated from the usury defense
because the note remains negotiable. There is some support for this argument
in the U.C.C.,36 but a recent Texas decision suggests that once a note becomes
33. At present, most of the Mortgage Corporation's Sellers are federally insured depository
institutions and most FNMA Sellers are substantial mortgage bankers. Thus, the likelihood of
failure of warranties for failure of the warrantor is not great.
34. Some statutes simply nullify any negotiable status of a consumer instrument. Others
negate any possibility that one could become a holder in due course of such an instrument. See
note 25 supra. This latter result would arise under the prospective new FTC regulations. See
cases cited note 30 supra.
35. The U.C.C.C., for example, preserves under certain circumstances claims and defenses
... of the consumer against the seller or lessor arising from that sale or lease of the property or
services." U.C.C.C. § 3.405(i) (1974 version). The FTC legend preserves "all claims of defenses
against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto ... ." 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1981).
Neither provision explicitly applies to defenses available to the consumer against the affiliated
lender who made the consumer loan. Thus, defenses against the lender, the argument would run,
are cut off by negotiation of the note to a holder in due course.
36. U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) requires that a promise to pay in a negotiable instrument must be
unconditional. U.C.C. § 3-105(l)(a) indicates, however, that a promise may still be "uncondi-
tional" although subject to implied or constructive conditions. See U.C.C. § 3-105, Official Com-
ment A; Mansion Carpets Inc. v. Marinoff, 24 A.D.2d, 947, 165 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1965) (check
remains negotiable although maker's promise is subject to condition that performance is forth-
coming). An argument can be made that the consumer's claims and defenses against a contractor
are "indirect conditions" insofar as the obligation of the consumer to the lender are concerned.
In the case of the FTC rule or state statutes requiring a legend on the note, there is an addi-
tional problem for one desiring some of the benefits of negotiability: the legend itself may make it
impossible for any holder of the instrument to become a holder m due course. One cannot be.
come a holder in due course if one has knowledge of any claims or defenses. U.C.C. § 3-302(l)(c).But U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(b) indicates that knowledge of a separate agreement related to the debt
evidenced by the note is not knowledge of a claim or defense under U.C.C. § 3-302(1) if one has
no knowledge that any claims or defenses have arisen under that agreement U.C.C. § 3-304,
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subject to some borrower's defenses its negotiable character is lost
completely.
37
Under the U.C.C. negotiability is generally created by "terms of art"-
such language as "pay to order". 38 The note is payable "to the order of" the
identified payee, the lender. Such technical language might seem inappropri-
ate in "plain language" documents like the HIL Note. Under the New York
and Connecticut versions of the "plain language" statute, the Note may satisfy
legal requirements because the statute permits the use of necessary technical
language. 39 In any event, the words "pay to order" themselves are not techni-
cal. The problem is that they create a special legal status that would not be
immediately apparent to a consumer borrower unversed in the law.
The drafters could have included, along with the technical language, a
"plain language" discussion of the negotiable character of the instrument and
its meaning. They elected not to take this course primarily because they be-
lieved that negotiability is a familiar concept to consumers. Consumers regu-
larly sign personal checks made out "to the order of' the payee. In addition,
the drafters were concerned that the description of negotiability in "plain lan-
guage" would necessarily be quite extensive, leading to an overlong note form.
Finally, there is always a danger in translating technical language into "plain
language" that the reiteration of the party's rights will alter them in some fash-
ion. Negotiability was a sufficiently important concern of the drafters that, on
balance, the risk was not worth the benefit.
None of these rationales for omitting a "plain language" discussion of
negotiability seems adequate. Even if consumers do understand that personal
checks that they execute pass in commerce free of defenses against the payee,
they can hardly be held to the knowledge that this result arises from the lan-
guage "to the order of' appearing on the face of the printed check. Nor would
they likely be aware that such language on the face of a fifteen-year install-
ment note would have the same consequences. If there is doubt whether a
consumer would understand the technical meaning of terms used in an instru-
ment he signs, then considerations of length, or even preservation of legal
meaning, should not take precedence over the fundamental policy of a "plain
language" statute in favor of consumer comprehension. If the concept of ne-
gotiability is too difficult to describe in simplified terms, the appropriate re-
sponse perhaps should be to eliminate this concept from consumer documents
altogether.
Official Comment 9, states that notice of the separate agreement may appear even In the
blswnment.
37. Insurance Agency Managers v. Gonzales, 578 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (con-
sumer home improvement contract obligation; contractual provision preserving some of maker's
claims and defenses rendered obligation "conditional" under U.C.C.).
38. U.C.C. §§ 3-104(1)(d), -1 10(l)-(3). See generally J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 14-4 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 'White & Summers].
39. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-156(a) (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-702
(McKinney Supp. 1980). The New York version reads: 'This subdivision shall not... prohibit
the use of words or phrases or forms of agreement required by state or federal law, rule or regula-
tion or by a governmental instrumentality." Id.
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I. HIL NoTE PARAGRAPH 2: INTEREST4°
A. Usury
This Paragraph states the interest rate. Sellers must warrant to the Mort-
gage Corporation that the rate meets applicable usury restrictions.4 1 Usury
will be a problem for HIL sellers in some states notwithstanding the preemp-
tion of state usury loans contained in the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980.42 Section 501(a)(1) of the Act preempts
state usury legislation and removes all usury restrictions as to first lien loans
on residential real property unless a specific subsequent state law reestablishes
usury limits. 43 The preemption under this section applies to loans made by
federally insured banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, mutual
savings banks, and mortgage bankers who are HUD approved lenders under
the National Housing Act, and even individual sellers of their own homes, but
relates only to first mortgage loans.44 Most HIL loans, of course, will not be
first mortgage loans and will not be affected by this section of the Act.
Sections 521 through 523 of the Act apply the usury preemption to all
loans made by federally insured depository institutions.45 Notwithstanding
the preemption, however, there is a "federal usury" limitation as to this section
of the new Act restricting interest rates on loans protected by the preemption
to one percent over the discount rate on 90 day commercial paper in the
lender's federal reserve district unless the state usury limit would be higher.
Most HIL loans the Corporation will buy during the pilot program likely will
come from "federal lenders," so the "federal usury" standard, at least, will
apply. FHA Title I property improvement loans are exempt from state usury
laws under the Housing and Community Development Act amendments of
1979. 6
During the 1979-80 nationwide inflation in interest rates, mortgage lend-
ing was significantly curtailed by low state usury ceilings. 4 7. In many states,
access to the secondary market, and thus to lendable funds, was destroyed by
40. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 2.
41. Sellers' Manual § 1.102s.
42. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12,
15 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation Act].
43. This state preemption has occurred already in at least eight jurisdictions. See, e.g., Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 5-13-101 to -105 (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 478-12 (Supp. 1980); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 16-207(a) (Supp. 1980); Act of June 4, 1981, [198114 Mass. Adv. Serv. 37 (to be codified at Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 183, § 63 (West)); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 47.203 (West 1981); Puerto Rico Laws
1980, Act 3, 8th. Extraord. Sess. § 1, 4 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 6411; 1981 S.C. Acts, H.B.
2164 § 3, 4 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 6415; S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 54-3-15 (Supp. 1981).
44. Deregulation Act, supra note 42, § 501(a)(1). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7, note (Supp.
1981).
45. Deregulation Act, supra note 42, §§ 521-23 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831(d), 1730g,
1785(g) (1980)).
46. Housing and Community Development Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-153,93
Stat. 1104 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 40, 42 U.S.C.A.).
47. One notable state experiencing such problems was New York.
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inflexible usury restrictions.48 Since usury is a difficult political issue for state
legislatures, the federal preemption legislation was an important step in re-
opening the secondary market to many states. The usury statutes will continue
to plague the HIL program in the case of those sellers who are not federally
insured depository institutions. Even as to sellers who are federally insured
depository institutions, the "federal usury" limit may be lower than the market
rate for junior liens, which likely will remain higher than the first lien rate.
49
Further, many states have separate, often more restrictive, usury provisions
relating to second mortgages or similar consumer loans.
50
A purchaser of a negotiable note cannot become a holder in due course
when the note on its face violates the usury laws.51 Thus, in many cases the
secondary market purchasers will be subject to available usury defenses. Nev-
ertheless, as indicated, the warranties made by the seller in the HIL program
transfer the risk of a usury violation to the seller. In this world of rapidly
easing usury restrictions sellers may take some comfort from case law that
holds that the usury limits at the time of suit, not at the time of the transaction,
provide the relevant test.
52
B. 'dd On" Interest
As Paragraph 2 makes clear, the pilot program has departed from the
standard consumer loan practice in many jurisdictions of using "add-on" or
"prepaid" interest. This decision engendered considerable comment from
lenders in many jurisdictions. Perhaps the foremost reason for this decision
was that, as a matter of policy, neither FNMA nor the Mortgage Corporation
desired to invoke prepayment penalties in connection with any consumer loan
program. The prepayment provision had already been deleted from the sin-
gle-family mortgages and the HIR Note later provides for prepayment without
penalty in this program.53 The traditional method of computing the refund of
interest when an add-on loan is prepaid is the Rule of 78s.5 4 This method
48. See, e.g., Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Development, 9 Real Est.
L.. 30, 35 (1980).
49. Of the jurisdictions noted in note 43, only Colorado, Massachusetts and Puerto Rico have
overriden that portion of the federal act that applies to loans by federally insured lenders other
than first lien, purchase-money loans.
50. Perhaps the best example of such legislation is the U.C.C.C. See note 24 supra.
51. The U.C.C. indicates that one takes an instrument with knowledge of defense if he "has
reason to know" of such defenses. See Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, § 5.29, at 325-26. For a
recent discussion of this provision, see Note, Commercial Law: Holders in Due Course and the
Interstate Land Sales Act, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 140 (1979). See also U.C.C. § 3-304; White & Sum-
mers, supra note 38, at 476.
52. See Northwestern State Bank v. Gangestad, 289 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 1979).
53. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 6.
54. To calculate a rebate under the Rule of 78s, the finance charge is multiplied by a fraction
derived from the sum of the periods to be rebated, which is the numerator, and the sum of the
total periods of the loan, which is the denominator. If a five-month rebate of a one-year, 12-
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gives the lender an unstated bonus upon prepayment-in effect a prepayment
penalty to the borrower. 5 Both the existence and the disguised nature of the
prepayment penalty made the device unattractive.5 6 Coupled with the basic
concern about prepayment was the realization that many HIL loans would
have substantial terms-fifteen to twenty-five years. Computing the Rule of
78s for such loans is a difficult matter. Add-on interest is not the practice in
first lien mortgages, and as a result the Corporation's staff and accounting sys-
tems would have required further modifications to account for prepayment on
"add on" loans. Permitting use of the Rule of 78s necessarily would have
interfered with uniform processing since some states require simple interest.
57
Permitting add-on interest without use of the Rule of 78s might have created a
confused situation for sellers used to accounting for add-on loans pursuant to
the Rule. Finally, several states have identified add-on interest as the hall-
mark of harsh consumer practices and have tied their strongest consumer leg-
islation to loans that involve add-on interest.58 The drafters were interested in
avoiding the reach of these restrictive statutes.
In a few jurisdictions, the usury laws permit a higher effective interest rate
if the add-on device is used.5 9 An add-on rate results in a higher effective
return because the borrower pays interest on the whole principal at the stated
rate over the life of the loan, instead of paying interest only on the declining
balance. As a result most states set different usury rates for add-on interest
loans.60 In those that do not, the add-on device obviously would allow the
lender more leeway with the usury limits. If the interest market again
skyrockets, institutions that do not have the benefit of the federal preemption
The finance charge would then be multiplied by this figure to determine the appropriate rebate.
See Note, Consumer Law: The Effect of Partial Prepayment on Precomputed Interest Loans, 29
Okla. L. Rev. 731, 732 (1976).
55. The Cost of Personal Borrowing in the United States 60 (C. Gushee ed. 1970); Note,
supra note 54, at 73 1.
56. A related problem is when and how the impact of the Rule of 78s should be disclosed to
borrowers under federal and state consumer disclosure laws. See, e.g., Note, supra note 54, at 734.
57. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 06.20.230, .250 (Supp. 1980) (applicable to loans less than
$25,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 516.031 (West Supp. 1980) (applicable to loans less than $25,000); Md.
Com. Law Code Ann. § 12-404(b) (Supp. 1980); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 398-A:2 (Supp. 1979); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 17:1 IA-44(l) (West Supp. 1980).
Florida's provisions are of a very limited application, since the law is inapplicable
to any person doing business under, and as permitted by, any law of this state or of the
United States relating to banks, savings banks, trust companies, building and loan as-
sociations, credit unions, or industrial loan and investment companies or to any bona
fide pawnbroking business transacted under a pawnbroker's license.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 516.0!(2) (1979).
58. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1321.57(3) (Page Supp. 1980); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 44-1205 (Supp. 1980), which removed usury limitations on most credit transactions and
simultaneously abolished the use of the Rule of 78s if "add-on interest computation is used.
59. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-8-2 as amended by 2 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 6402 (1981) and
W. Va. Code § 47-6-5A (Supp. 1981), both of which allow 6% add-on interest on installment
loans. Assuming 12 equal monthly payments, the 6% add-on is equivalent to more than 11%
simple interest, which is significantly higher than the maximum 8% simple interest that both stat-
utes allow parties to contract for in writing.
60. Typically state usury statutes set a simple or add-on interest rate limit and authorize the
equivalent of that rate as the maximum limit in the alternate system. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.
§ 57-101.1 (Supp. 1981); IMI. Ann. Stat. ch 74. § 31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
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of usury laws may be unable to take advantage of the HIL program for certain
periods of time. In some jurisdictions this disability will occur earlier than it
would have if add-on interest were permitted.
C Other Loan Terms
Paragraph 2 is designed to establish a contract interest rate for the entire
period during which principal is unpaid, including the period following de-
fault and the period following judgment (if applicable). In at least one juris-
diction, the case law required an even more specific reference to post judgment
interest.6 1
The Paragraph provides that "interest will be charged beginning on the
date of this Note. . . ." The drafters contemplated that HIL loans would be
fully funded on the date of the Note. When disclosure laws require a "rescis-
sion period," the program contemplates that the Note will be executed and
funded at the beginning of that period. If rescission occurs, the lender will
have to seek restitution of the funds and, when appropriate and desired, daily
interest.
Some lenders undoubtedly will desire to control disbursements of the
loan throughout the construction period to ensure that the loan proceeds are
used for the purposes intended and that the project is completed within budget
and as originally specified. Indeed, all sellers will be required to warrant that
the proceeds have been so used, that the improvement is complete and that
there are no outstanding lien claims. Although Paragraph 2 makes no refer-
ence to a controlled advances loan, lenders are free to undertake such a loan
arangement if they deem it necessary. The Sellers' Manual contains an op-
tional change in the documentation to provide for such loan disbursement. 62
The permitted language allows deferment of principal payments during the
disbursement period, with interest accruing only from date of disbursement.
The proceeds of the loan must be fully disbursed, at any event, by the time it is
delivered to the Corporation. Mortgage Covenant 15 additionally aids the
lender by requiring compliance by the borrower with the "home rehabilita-
tion, improvement, repair or other loan agreement which Borrower enters into
with the Lender. s63 Thus any violation of the loan agreement becomes an
event of default under the mortgage.
61. See Turner Coleman, Inc. v. Ohio Constr. & Eng'r, Inc., 272 S.C. 289, 251 S.E.2d 738
(1979) (statutory rate for post-judgment interest does not apply where the parties have expressly
contracted upon a different rate). Compare with Little v. Umted Natl Investors Corp., 160 Conn.
534, 542, 280 A.2d 890, 894 (1971), in which the court found that
since the agreement of the defendant was that "interest shall accrue at the rate of nine
per cent (9%) per annum on unpaid principal balances, before or after maturity, by accel-
eration or otherwise' the rate of 'legal interest' was thus fixed by the agreement of the
parties and ... the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the judgment at that rate.
Id. However, the drafters of the HIL Note concluded that Little does not require a separate speci-
fication of interest.
62. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, Exhibit 18f, at 76.
63. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 15.
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IV. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 3: PAYMENTS 4
This Paragraph creates an unfortunate ambiguity that continues through
Paragraph 4 and certain covenants in the HIL Mortgage as well. The ambigu-
ity relates to when the late payment charge is payable. It is clear that under
Note Paragraph 4 the late charge potentially is incurred as soon as a payment
is late for a specified number of days-no notice is required. The instruments
are unclear, however, as to when the borrower must pay this charge. The Par-
agraph sets forth the required level debt service payments and states that the
borrower agrees to
make these payments every month until I have paid all of the princi-
pal and interest and any other charges, described below, that I may
pay under this Note. If, on [date of the last payment], I still owe
amounts under this Note, I will pay all those amounts, in full, on that
date.
65
The intent of the drafters was that the late charge (provided in Note Paragraph
4) be paid when incurred. The Servicers' Manual makes this clear.66 Note
Paragraph 3, however, by specifically referring to these late charges (the only
"other charges" described in the Note), permits a construction that level debt
service payments will continue for the full term and that any additional
charges will be paid at the end of the term.67
Similarly, the preamble of the HIL Mortgage does not mention that the
mortgage secures the borrower's late charge obligation per se; it discusses only
an "indebtedness evidenced by [the] Note," described as "monthly install-
ments of principal and interest, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not
sooner paid, due and payable on [the end of the debt term]."' 68 This language
indicates either that the mortgage does not secure the late charge obligation at
all or that it secures the obligation as a sum payable at the end of the term.
Other mortgage language confirms that the mortgage does secure the late
charges in some fashion. Mortgage Covenant 1 includes a promise to pay late
charges "as provided in the Note,"6 9 and Mortgage Covenant 17 permits ac-
celeration and foreclosure for failure to perform "any covenant or agreement
... in this Mortgage."
70
The problem is compounded by the application of the payments covenant
in Mortgage Covenant 3. (rhere is no application of payments provision in
the Note itself). This Covenant provides that payments received by the lender
shall be applied first to payment of escrow charges, then to interest, and then
64. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 3.
65. See id. (emphasis added).
66. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., Home Improvement Loan Servicers' Manual
§ 1.209 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Servicers' Manual].
67. Note Paragraph 4C adds to the confusion in the Note. It provides that the borrower is in
default if he fails to pay the overdue installment within 10 days of notice. See N.C. Note, infra
Appendix A, Para. 4(C); id. Para. 4(B). It does not provide that failure to remit a late payment
penalty at the same time will be a default.
68. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, preamble.
69. See id., Covenant I.
70. See id., covenant 17 ("Deed of Trust" substituted for "Mortgage").
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to principal.71 The Covenant purportedly refers to "all payments received by
Lender under the Note .... -72 A late charge is clearly "payable under the
Note," but the Covenant does not require that an amount be allocated to re-
duce the late charge claim. The late charge is not included as part of a regular
payment obligation. This is understandable since the parties do not anticipate
that the borrower will be consistently late and thus regularly incur late
charges. When the late charge is payable, however, the instruments make no
provision for how it is to be received and accounted for.
The amount of the late charge penalty seems insignificant, but such pen-
alties often cumulate to a significant income item for a lender. The late charge
ambiguity is also important because confusion in this area can confuse the
lender/servicer's accounting at the critical moment of incipient or actual de-
fault, depending upon the lender's accounting methods. The only sensible res-
olution of the ambiguities here is that the charges are payable when
incurred-and are not simply added to the loan balance. The best way to deal
with late charges under the instruments would be to collect them as separate
items when incurred, not to deduct them from ensuing level debt service pay-
ments. Obviously, the lender should consider carefully whether it is appropri-
ate or desirable to attempt foreclosure when the only default is with respect to
late charges.
V. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 4: BORROwER's FAILURE
TO PAY AS REQUIRED
7 3
The default and remedies provisions are the functional heart of any secur-
ity arrangement. Like most real estate security instruments, the HIL instru-
ments include separate default and remedy provisions for the Note and
Mortgage, with the Note referring to (but not incorporating) the Mortgage.
This arrangement is designed to preserve to whatever extent possible the ad-
vantages of negotiability. Not surprisingly, recent consumer legislation has
focused upon the creditor's rights respecting the declaration of default and
ensuing remedies. Thus, the tension between consumer protection and com-
mercial viability that pervades the HIL documents played a major role in
shaping the provision of Note Paragraph 4.
Even the basic structure of Paragraph 4 was influenced by consumer leg-
islation. The first lien note, which served as the starting point for the HIL
instrument, provides the lender with an acceleration right without ever actu-
ally identifying an event that is defined as "default." Instead the instrument
simply states that if the borrower has not paid an overdue installment within a
given period of time following notice, the lender has the right to accelerate.
71. See id., covenant 3. This allocation is required of federally chartered savings and loan
associations by regulation. Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations provide: "The associa-
tion shall not deduct late charges from regular periodic installment payments on the loan, but
shall collect them as such from the borrower." 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(d).
72. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 17 (emphasis added).
73. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 4.
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The intent of the drafters of the first lien provision was to avoid the automatic
creation of a default or acceleration since the lender's subsequent failure to
take action in a particular case might operate as a waiver if the borrower again
failed to meet his obligations at some later time. The drafters of the first lien
instruments included a clause providing that prior forebearance does not
waive rights relating to subsequent defaults,74 but were aware that some courts
do not feel bound by such language if it would require a result perceived to be
"inequitable."7 5 The HIL Note, unlike the first lien note, does include an
identified event of default. The drafters would have preferred to use the for-
mat followed in the first lien note, but were constrained to identify an event of
default because so many consumer statutes have provisions that turn upon the
specific declaration of default.7 6 Commonly, these statutes exempt first lien
purchase money loans from their provisions, but apply fully to HILs.
In addition to the basic structure of the Paragraph, the drafters' commit-
ment to uniformity necessarily was modified, if not abandoned, under the
pressure of a wide variety of state consumer protection statutes. Although uni-
formity was abandoned in a number of sections, there were sections of uni-
form language that were preserved. Upon analysis, it is often difficult to
discern the reason for the adherence to uniform language in one instance in
light of the abandonment of uniformity in others. Perhaps the best explana-
tion is that the drafters were caught up in an ongoing process marked by se-
vere deadlines and constant input from local counsel in fifty-four jurisdictions.
Decisions were made as problems arose and consistency could not be guaran-
teed. As the HIL program evolves through the pilot stage, it is likely that more
consistency will appear in the drafting decisions. This Article cannot identify
all the specific changes made to "tailor" Paragraph 4 to each jurisdiction, but
will note only highlights.
A. Late Charges
The standard form permits the lender to impose a late charge without
74. The language appears in the body of the First Lien Note, supra note 12, which does not
have numbered paragraphs. This language is equivalent to that in the first Lien Deed of Trust,
Covenant I 1 (copy on file in N.C. L. Rev. office).
75. See, e.g., Soltis v. Liles, 275 Or. 537, 543, 551 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1976) (court found that
nonwaiver provisions of an installment sales contract were "ineffective and [did] not prevent the
promisor from waiving the conditions of the contract through his conduct."); see also 3A A.
Corbin, Contracts § 763 (1960); cf. J.E.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Taco Pronto, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 573,
244 S.E.2d 253 (1978) (nonwaiver provision in contract may itself be waived); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 163, 240 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1963), afrd 20
A.D.2d 635, 246 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1964) (same); contra, Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Walter,
363 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1961); Zeller v. Universal Say. Ass'n, 580 S.W.2d 658 (rex. Civ. App. 1979).
See generally Rosenthal, The Role of Courts of Equity in Preventing Acceleration Predicated
Upon a Mortgagor's Inadvertent Default, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 897 (1971).
76. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 32.20.070(b) (Supp. 1980); Kan. Stat Ann. § 16a-5-110 (1974);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, § 5-110 (1980) (amended by Law of May 18, 1981, ch. 281, § 4, 1981
Me. Legis. Serv. (1981), to exclude first mortgages on real estate other than mobile home loans and
for which the security interest is granted for the purpose of purchasing or constructing a residence
of four units or less); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 61.24.040 (1965), as amended by Law of May 14,
1981, ch. 161, 1981 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West 1981) (deed of trust foreclosures); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 425.103, .104 (West 1974 and West Supp. 1981).
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specific notice and permits the parties to designate how late a payment must be
before the charge is imposed. The form has blanks designating the time when
the late charge is incurred and the amount of the charge (as a percentage of
the late payment). The Servicers' Manual states that once the loan is sold to
the Mortgage Corporation no charge may be imposed for a delinquency of less
than ten days and no charge may exceed five percent of the late installment.77
In addition to the problems discussed above on the question of when a
late charge is payable, the late charge provision presents other pitfalls for the
unwary lender. The basic problem is that a large number of jurisdictions pro-
hibit or restrict the use of late charges in consumer loans.78 In addition to a
variety of consumer legislation provisions, the important case of Garrett v.
Coast and Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association,79 construes late
payment charges to be effectively liquidated damages provisions.80 Many
states have case law or statutes that require that a liquidated-damages provi-
sion reflect a reasonable estimate of the actual damages that might be suf-
fered.8' Garrett held that a late charge must be measured by these standards,
and thus declared invalid a penalty stated as a percentage of the loan balance,
rather than as a percentage of the late payment itself.82 The language of Sub-
paragraph 4A states the charge as a percentage of the overdue payment, sub-
ject to a fixed minimum and maximum. The amount of the charge and the
tolerances are left to the discretion of the lender. Thus, although the form of
the late payment provision would likely pass muster under the Garrett case, no
firm conclusion as to the legality of the charge is possible without a compari-
son of the precise amount of the charge and the likely damages that would be
suffered by the lender from a late payment.
Although the Sellers' Manual includes no specific warranty that a late
payment penalty satisfies state law, there is a general warranty that all provi-
sions of the Note and Mortgage are in conformance with state law.83 In any
event, the collection and application of the late payment penalty is primarily a
matter of concern to the lender, not the Corporation. The lender as servicer,
77. Servicers' Manual, supra note 6, at § 1.209. See also Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at
§ 1.102x. The FHLBB regulations prohibit a federal savings and loan association from imposing
a late charge for payments which are less than 15 days late. 12 C.F.R. § 454.8-3(e)(i)-(ii) (1981).
The regulations also limit the charge to a maximum of 5%. The Corporation's general policy in
preparing the Sellers' and Servicers' Manuals was to track the FHLBB regulations. The disparity
between the 10-day and 15-day late charge "grace period" is most likely a drafting error.
78. See Alaska Stat. § 06.20.260 (Supp. 1979); Cal Civ. Code § 2954.4 (West Supp. 1981);
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10242.5 (West Supp. 1981); Idaho Code § 28-33-203 (Supp. 1980); Ind.
Code Ann. § 24-4.5-3-203 (Burns 1974); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140, § 90A (West 1974); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 17:12B-159(6)(b) (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 254-b (McKinney Supp.
1980); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-175 (1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1321.57 (Page Supp. 1979); Okla.
Stat. tit. 14A, §3-203 (1971); Or. Rev. Stat. § 86.160-.185 (1980); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
5069-5.02(3) (Vernon 1971); Utah Code Ann. §70B-3-203 (Supp. 1979).
79. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
80. Id. at 737-41, 511 P.2d at 1201-03, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 849-51.
81. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 50 (1975).
82. 9 Cal. 3d at 740, 511 P.2d at 1203, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
83. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at § 1.102s.
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retains late charges.
8 4
In light of the fact that a large number of jurisdictions restrict or prohibit
late payment penalties, the question arose as to whether Subparagraph 4A
should be deleted entirely. Lenders in states that permit the late charges
seemed to feel strongly that the device was useful. The desire to make the
program as attractive as possible to potential sellers led the drafters to leave
the late charge provision in the Note. Further, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board regulations provide that federally chartered savings and loan institu-
tions may impose late charges.8 5 Although there has been no specific court
decision regarding the preemptive effect of this portion of the regulations, it
seems clear from analogous court decisions that these provisions would be re-
garded as having preemptive effect, permitting the use of a late charge provi-
sion by a federal savings and loan association in every state notwithstanding
contrary provisions of state law.8 6 The preemptive federal regulations plus the
desire for uniformity led the drafters to leave the provision in the Note even in
those jurisdictions where some types of lenders would be unable to impose
such a charge. The Sellers' Manual allows sellers to ascertain whether the
charge may be made as to a particular loan or type of loan and either to insert
zeros or to strike out the language entirely where a late charge would be inap-
propriate.8 7 The Mortgage Corporation has no requirement that loans it
purchases have any late charge provision.
A recent Missouri junior lien statute prohibits the "charg[ing], con-
tract[ing] for or receiv[ing]" of late charges in connection with a second mort-
gage loan.88 Violation of the statute results in a forfeiture of all interest under
the loan.8 9 The severity of this penalty led the drafters to conclude that there
was a danger even in having late charge language in the Note notwithstanding
that the late charge was set forth as zero. Therefore, the Missouri version of
Note Paragraph Four does not contain any late charge language at all.9° By
contrast, note forms in the U.C.C.C. states,91 and in California, Ohio, North
Carolina and Texas, where various aspects of late payment charges are pro-
hibited,92 still contain the standard language for late charges. Lenders who
are not federal savings and loan associations must conform to local law in
filling in the blanks.
84. Servicers' Manual, supra note 6, at § 1.209.
85. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(d) (1981).
86. Although there is some question, the mortgage instrument provisions most likely enjoy
the "protection" of federal preemption where available. See Randolph, supra note 1, at 587-90.
87. See Sellers' Manual, supra note 9,,at § 1.10 2x.
88. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.233 (Supp. 1980).
89. Id. § 408.236.
90. But see Randolph, supra note 1, at 557 n.42, for a discussion of the special arrangements
for Missouri federal savings and loans associations.
91. See note 24 supra.
92. See note 78 supra.
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B. Notice of Default
Unlike the approach taken regarding the late charge provision, the HIL
forms provide the parties no discretion in setting default notice periods. The
standard language provides that the lender may send a notice of imminent
default93 as soon as94 a payment is overdue. If no payment is received within
ten days after the notice is mailed Subparagraph 4B provides that a default
occurs. Under Subparagraph 4C, the default does not automatically trigger an
acceleration, but the lender may proceed to accelerate the loan without giving
any further notice.95 The only further contact the borrower must receive from
the lender will be a mailed notification of an imminent foreclosure sale. Typi-
cally, of course, the contacts between borrower and lender will be much more
extensive than the instruments might suggest.
96
There are several variants of this standard language. The drafters at-
tempted to conform the provision to state law in such a way that acceleration
could occur at the earliest possible time following the standard ten day period
and with the minimum number of notices. The drafters developed an alterna-
tive basic form of Subparagraph 4B for those states, such as Kansas, 97
Maine 98 and Pennsylvania, 99 where notice of delinquency cannot be given for
a period of time following a missed payment. Under this variant, the "de-
93. Typically the notice will not be a simple notice of default but will include the foreclosure
warnings and information regarding borrower's rights required before the lender resorts to the
foreclosure remedy. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 17; Randolph, supra
note 1, at 607-11.
94. Although the instruments appear to contemplate the possibility of the Lender mailing an
overdue notice immediately, a more plausible construction would be that the Lender should wait
until the time has run for triggering the late payment charge to send the notice. See text accompa-
nying note 106 infra.
95. Of course, the lender conceivably could sue on the accelerated debt at this point without
proceeding to foreclose-a generally recognized but rarely invoked option. In some states with
anti-deficiency protection for certain types of loans, the separate suit on the note would preserve
the deficiency right. Oregon prohibits deficiency judgments following foreclosure of purchase
money residential mortgages. Or. Rev. Stat. § 88.070 (1977). A separate suit on the note, without
foreclosure, would permit recovery of a judgment for the whole amount, but would cost the mort-
gagee its priority. There is at least an argument that an HIL lender is a purchase money lender for
purposes of anti-deficiency legislation. See Prunty v. Bank of Am., 37 Cal. App. 3d 430, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 370 (1974) (residential construction lender who did not finance land acquisition is a
"purchase money lender" within meaning of California anti-deficiency scheme.) In addition,Washington prohibits deficiency judgements following foreclosures of deeds of trust, Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 61.24.100 (Supp. 1981); compare with Or. Rev. Stat. § 88.770(2) (1979) (deficiency
barred only when property sold at trustee's sale, not when trust deed foreclosed by judicial action).Suit on the note in Washington gives the lender access to the debtor's other assets as well as the
property.
A number of states, all in the far West, have "one form of action" statutes which require a
secured party to foreclose first. See Osborne & Nelson, supra nbte 2, at 526-28. Such statutes aresometimes coupled with anti-deficiency legislation. Together, the two devices restrict the secured
lender to the property alone, creating a statutory class of "non-recourse" loans. Id.
96. The industry practice involves considerable attention to defaulted accounts. Typically a
lender will foreclose only as a "last resort," for both economic and social reasons. The Mortgage
Corporation's procedures follow and formalize this industry practice. See note 110 and accompa-
nying text infra.
97. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-5-l10 (Supp. 1973).98. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, § 5-110(1) (1980).
99. 41 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 403 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
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fault" occurs immediately upon the borrower's missing the payment date. The
language then goes on to provide for notice if the borrower is in default for a
stated period (whatever the statutory minimum would be). As discussed
above, 10° the drafters were interested in postponing the moment at which a
default is identified in order to avoid a determination that the lender had
waived its right to insist on prompt payment by its inaction in response to a
previous succession of insignificant defaults. The desire to provide for a one-
notice acceleration overrode the waiver consideration in those states in which
the variant language is used. Only the Maine language, in response to statu-
tory mandate,10 1 requires that the lender have evidence that the borrower has
received the notice before the default remedies are invoked.
Regardless of when a default technically occurs, the lender has no right to
invoke any default remedies until the notice period has run. Wherever possi-
ble, this notice period was kept to a period of ten days.'0 2 In most cases, the
notice will be more elaborate than a simple notice of nonpayment, since HIL
Mortgage Covenant 17, setting forth the notice requirements necessary for a
foreclosure, requires notice of the right to reinstate, notice of the right to seek
an injunction of foreclosure when the borrower disputes the legality of the
lender's action (in private foreclosure jurisdictions), and whatever other infor-
mation might be required in a particular jurisdiction.10 3 Although there is no
cross reference between the notice provision in the Note and the notice provi-
sion in the Mortgage, the drafters intended that one notice serve both purposes
when the lender intends to accelerate and foreclose.10
4
Once the condition of default has persisted beyond the minimum notice
period, the lender may elect to accelerate and, assuming it has given the de-
fault/foreclosure notice, can proceed to foreclose.10 - At that point, the instru-
ments provide that the borrower becomes liable for costs and fees. Until a
declaration of acceleration, the lender's only compensation for the delin-
quency is the late charge.1° 6 Subparagraph 4D, which provides for reimburse-
ment of costs, might be construed to permit the lender to charge costs arising
before the acceleration, but this is neither perceived industry practice nor the
intent of the drafters.
Lenders who elect to insert a late payment penalty provision in the Note
may find it prudent to delay taking further action to establish that a default
exists until the late payment period has run. It is possible that a court would
100. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
101. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, § 5-110(1)(B) (1980).
102. Some states require a longer minimum notice period before the lender invokes remedies,
e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16a-5-111(3) (1974) (20 days); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9-A, § 5-111(1)
(1980) (20 days); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 408.555.1 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (20 days); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 425.105 (West 1974Y (15 days).
103. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 17.
104. For a discussion of the lender's other alternative, suit on the note alone, see note 95 supra.
Acceleration of the Note for purposes of suit could be accomplished with the simple notice form
required by the Note alone.
105. For a discussion of the foreclosure notice, see Randolph, supra note 1, at 607-11.
106. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra.
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conclude that by establishing the late payment period the lender has indicated
to the borrower that only defaults continuing after the running of the late pay-
ment period will be deemed the kind of defaults that trigger a right to acceler-
ation. Lenders may wish to send the necessary "preacceleration" notice only
after the late payment period has ended and thus delay other remedies until
the expiration of the notice period following that mailing.
C Consumer Protection Aspects of Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4 punctiliously complies with the welter of consumer protec-
tion laws throughout the country. In addition, the consumer receives several
benefits under the Corporation's instruments that go beyond the protections
afforded by customary lender practices prevailing in many jurisdictions.
Under Mortgage Covenant 18 the borrower may avoid acceleration ("rein-
state") by paying the overdue payment and any costs and curing any other
breaches under the Mortgage. Further, since the Corporation has voluntarily
drafted the Note in plain language for all jurisdictions, a borrower, perhaps
for the first time, will be able to ascertain at least some of his contract rights
without the benefit of a legal education.10
7
Unfortunately for consumer interests, the drafters' efforts to conform to
industry practices required that for the most part they conform the creditors'
rights set forth in the instruments to the prevailing practices of responsible
lenders.'08 This "prevailing practice" is predicated basically on a notion of
107. In at least one particular, however, the provision for attorneys' fees, the language of the
paragraph might be somewhat misleading, although technically in compliance with the law. The
relevant language reads:
Note Holder will have the right to be paid back for all of its costs and expenses to the
extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses include, for example, reason-
able attorneys' fees.
N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 4(D).
A number of jurisdictions restrict the collection of attorneys' fees in consumer transactions. See,
e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(c) (West 1980); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 8.823(3) (1977); 41 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 406(2)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1980); S.C. Code § 37.3-404 (Supp. 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 4527 (1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 422.411 (West 1974). The Note language could be read by the
unrepresented and untutored consumer to suggest that applicable law authorizes the collection of
attorneys' fees. It should be noted that the language appears in the text of what the consumer will
perceive to be an authoritative form drafted specifically for use in his jurisdiction.
Most of the statutes cited above apply to foreclosures, not simple note collections. HIL Mort-
gage Covenant 13 is more specific in restricting the applicability of the attorneys' fees language,
see N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 13; and, since the issue will arise almost
exclusively in the context of mortgage foreclosures, it cannot be said that the drafters have over-
reached their legal rights in this case. On the other hand, if the purpose of the drafting of the note
in "plain language" was to give the consumer a clear picture of his legal rights and responsibilities,
the drafters can be faulted for phrasing which suggests to the consumer that resistance to the
lender's position in any dispute may run up a claim for attorneys' fees which the consumer will
have to pay, in addition to extra interest, in the event he ultimately loses the dispute. Faced with
the possibility of paying the lender's attorneys' fees, the consumer may be cowed into compliance
with the lender's wishes even before consulting an attorney himself to determine the legitimacy of
his position in the dispute.
In Kansas, which prohibits the use of language providing for attorneys' fees in notes and
mortgages (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2312 (1976)), the uniform language reference to attorneys' fees is
eliminated.
108. See Randolph, supra note I, at 548-51.
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lender paternalism, rather than consumer protection. The lender paternalism
model provides far more severe remedies to the lender than it will use in the
typical case. As one industry official phrased the issue:
[Lender's remedies] are frequently used as standby, emergency meas-
ures to protect the lender in extreme situations. They are neverthe-
less important. We seem to agree upon the necessity of having fire
extinguishers handy even though we fortunately don't need to use
them daily. 109
The model postulates that a lender is able to discern a "bad defaulter"
from a "good defaulter" and can temper its remedies accordingly. A "good
defaulter" will receive far more consideration than the loan instruments sug-
gest. For example, under the Corporation's Servicers' Manual the servicer
must make extensive efforts to contact the defaulting borrower personally and
attempt to work out the borrower's financial circumstances without foreclos-
ing.110 This is consistent with the practices of most insitutional home mort-
gage lenders. The foreclosure to default ratio generally is very low,"' since
most lenders work hard to resolve a default situation in such a way that the
home owner retains his property.
On the other hand, when the borrower is a "bad defaulter," lenders desire
to have the right to oust him summarily from his property, both in order to
protect their security and to obtain leverage by the threat of immediate fore-
closure when less severe forms of persuasion have not availed. The HIL Note
and Mortgage give the foreclosing lender some very powerful weapons against
"bad defaulters." The Corporation's own control over the foreclosure process
for loans it purchases mitigates the potential unfairness, yet the rights under
the instruments are not subject to the same controls when used by lenders for
their own portfolio. The fact that the instruments are decidedly more gener-
ous to borrowers than many of those currently in use should not disguise their
potential for severe treatment of consumer borrowers.
This reality is disturbing from the consumer's standpoint in light of the
fact that the use of the FNMA/FHLMC forms is becoming so widespread that
109. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Federal
National Mortgage Association Public Meeting on Conventional Mortgage Forms (Comm. Print
1971) (statement of Paul Basner) [hereinafter cited as FNMA Public Meeting]. For a fuller discus-
sion of the context of this meeting, see Randolph, supra note I, at 550, and authorities cited
therein.
110. Servicers' Manual, supra note 66, at §§ 1.201-.211. The Manual indicates that the ser-
vicer must conduct an extensive analysis of all reasonable alternatives which would permit the
borrower to achieve payment stability within a reasonable time. This analysis will take at least 60
days in every case, id. § 1.205, and will involve at least one face-to-face meeting with the defaulted
Borrower, id. § 1.204. The Corporation reserves to itself the final decision to accelerate, following
the Servicer's recommendation. The recommendation should be submitted only "when Servicer
has exhausted all possible means of liquidating the delinquency." Id. § 1.206.
111. Although home mortgage defaults and foreclosures have increased recently, they still
represent a tiny percentage of loans. During the first quarter of 1981, defaults for more than 90
days existed in 0.65% of all home mortgage loans, and in 0.32% of all conventional home mortgage
loans. Equivalent figures for 1979 were 0.46% and 0.24%, respectively. Foreclosures were com-
menced in the first quarter of 1981 as to 0.16% of the total loans and 0.09% of conventional loans.
The equivalent 1979 figures were 0.15% and 0.07%, respectively. Mortgage Bankers Association of
America, National Delinquency Survey (1981).
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they are establishing a new industry standard. Although the forms do exceed
the minimal debtor protections available under existing practices in some ju-
risdictions, the uniform forms may retard the development of additional
needed reforms in those or other jurisdictions. This is because lending indus-
try lobbyists may cite the FNMA/FHLMC forms as the "standard of fair
treatment" in resisting consumer efforts to achieve broader consumer protec-
tive legislation.
Turning to the language of Note Paragraph Four itself and ignoring the
restraints upon overzealous resort to lenders' remedies set forth in the HIL
Servicers' Manual, we find a statement of remedies that is at best inconsistent
in its concern for the protection of the borrower/consumer. The Paragraph
clearly reflects the banking industry belief that a lender should have more
legal rights upon default than it is ever likely to use. The Paragraph confers
upon the lender the right to accelerate in the shortest possible time. Where
there is no state legislation controlling the notice period, the standard period
of time following default in payment before the lender can accelerate is 11
days. The only delay is for the ten day notice period. 112 Since the period runs
from the mailing of the notice, not from the receipt," 3 it is quite possible that
acceleration would be instituted before a borrower actually became aware of
the notice. It is difficult to see why, as a minimum standard, the period before
acceleration could not be measured from the date indicated on a return receipt
form of certified delivery or other actual delivery evidence. Further, the de-
fault notice period provided under the Note, like the industry practice and the
statutory provisions in several states, does not provide a unsophisticated con-
sumer borrower any reasonable time to deal with the problem and avoid accel-
eration (assuming-as we do here-that there has been no prior contact with
the lender regarding the default). The brevity of the notice period can thus
lead to an unconscionably rapid termination of the borrower's rights on the
loan. In jurisdictions that otherwise provide for rapid foreclosure after accel-
eration, the risk is not simply loss of the loan, but loss of the consumer's
home.1
4
The drafters can put forward two justifications for the short notice period
before acceleration. The first is that junior lenders are in a precarious position
112. This compares to the already short, 30-day notice period in the First Lien Note, supra
note 12.
113. The exception to this rule is in Maine, where the statutes require the default period to be
measured in most cases from receipt of the default notice. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 9-A, § 5-
110(l)(A) (1980).
114. Industry spokesmen point to the cost savings resulting from rapid foreclosure. They ar-
gue that such savings reduce the cost of borrowing for all consumers in states which have rapid
foreclosures. Although studies have demonstrated that there is likely a cost savings in "fast fore-
closure" states, see, e.g., McElhone & Cremer, Loan Foreclosure Costs Affected by Varied State
Regulations, Fed. Home Loan Bank Board J., June, 1975; Committee on Mortgage Law and Prac-
tice, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 413 (1968);
the author is aware of no studies indicating that these savings have had an impact on the cost of
consumer borrowing in those states. Indeed, the low ratio of foreclosures to loans placed would
suggest that any cost savings would have small significance in the overall market although they
might improve slightly the financial position of individual lenders.
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when a senior lien loan goes into default 11 5 and that they need to be able to
accelerate quickly to protect themselves in the senior's foreclosure as best they
can. Even when a senior lien is not yet in default, the junior lender would
argue, a default on its secured loan may presage a default on other debts; and
the lender will have to move quickly to establish its claims and decide how to
pursue them in light of the relative weakness of its security position. In fact,
this justification has merit primarily in a few power of sale jurisdictions with
rapid foreclosures and inadequate statutory or common law notice require-
ments 1 6 to protect junior lien holders. 1 7 In the vast majority of cases, the
HIL lender would be able to deal with any problems with senior liens without
need for rapid foreclosure of its own lien. When emergency action is required,
HI. Mortgage Covenant 7 permits the HIL lender to displace immediately
any threatening senior lien. In addition, other language dealing with default
on senior liens could have been drafted that would have protected the Mort-
gage Corporation as well' 18 without exposing the borrower to a rapid acceler-
ation in every case. The Mortgage Corporation's second justification is that in
drafting the default and foreclosure language it was simply mirroring the pre-
vailing lender practices in the home improvement loan industry. This defense
is inadequate from a consumer standpoint. Harsh and unfair practices cannot
be justified merely because they are widespread, and certainly could not have
been within the intent of Congress when it mandated the purchase of "invest-
ment quality" loans.119
115. When the senior forecloses, the junior must produce sufficient cash to at least meet the
highest bid at the foreclosure sale-usually the bid of the senior in the amount of the senior debt.
The alternative is loss of the junior's security interest in the property. The junior must evaluate its
position and act to protect it, when warranted, within a relatively brief period, often no more than
10 days from the time it receives notice of the senior's action.
116. Although the HIL lender might receive some benefit from rapid acceleration rights in
jurisdictions which provide no other way for the junior lender to protect itself from senior de-
faults, the benefit would be insignificant compared to the overall risk undertaken by junior lenders
in such jurisdictions. If, indeed, the HIL drafters had believed that, as a practical matter, the HIL
lender would not receive adequate notice of an impending senior default in a given jurisdiction, it
is likely that they would have prepared no instruments for that jurisdiction. The risk of destruc-
tion of the HIL lien by a "surprise" foreclosure of a senior lien simply would be too great. The
rapid acceleration rights reserved to the HIL lender, therefore, cannot be justified by reference to
these hypothetical "inadequate notice" jurisdictions, but must instead find a basis m some more
realistic concern of the FNMA/FLHMC drafters.
117. By far the majority of American jurisdictions provide a framework through which the
junior may be assured of notice of any imminent foreclosure by a senior lien. See Randolph,
supra note 1, at 613. Notice of an impending senior foreclosure does not resolve all problems, of
course. If the junior lienholder wishes to make a claim from the proceeds of the senior foreclo-
sure, it must accomplish acceleration prior to that foreclosure. The HIL instruments presently
provide that default on any senior lien is a default under the HIL instruments as well, see N.C.
Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 4, thus permitting acceleration within 10 days of the
time the HIL lender becomes aware of the senior default.
Although it is true that rapid acceleration is desirable in this case, the provisions of Note
Paragraph Four go beyond the need for rapid foreclosure here and provide similarly rapid fore-
closure in the case of every default on the HIL loan, the bulk of which will not be violations of
Mortgage Covenant 4, but rather failure to pay the HIL note payments on time. As the text
indicates, rapid foreclosure in these circumstances is not justified by the argument that the HIL
lender would otherwise be unable to deal effectively with a senior foreclosure.
118. For instance, rapid acceleration might be authorized only when the borrower has de-
faulted on an obligation giving rise to a senior lien.
119. This standard derives from the statutory directive of FHLMC to buy only loans "of such
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An additional consumer concern is the absence of any reference to the
borrower's reinstatement right in the Note. The "plain language" Note ex-
plains in simple, easy-to-read detail that the lender may call in the entire prin-
cipal amount (accelerate) on the basis of a single default. 120 The Note does
not explain, however, that the borrower has a right to reinstate. This right is
set forth deep in the Mortgage instrument, 121 which is not a plain language
document.'2 The ambiguity on the face of the Note is compounded by Para-
graph 5, the "reference over" provision of the Note, which identifies the Mort-
gage as an instrument and states "how and under what conditions I may be
required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts I owe under this
Note" without indicating that the Mortgage contains a right to reinstate fol-
lowing an acceleration.
A possible explanation for the omission of the right to reinstate from the
Note was the concern for preserving negotiability, a status that could be jeop-
ardized by too much detail in the loan provisions. On the other hand, the
U.C.C. clearly permits reference to the Mortgage for elaboration of accelera-
tion rights,'2 and it would seem to permit as well reference to circumstances
in which such rights are limited.
. Separate Suit on the Note
In almost every jurisdiction, a secured lender has the option to sue on the
note and proceed against the security and any other property of the debtor as a
general judgment creditor (waiving the priority provided by the Mortgage).
The usual reason for taking this course is to avoid the impact of antideficiency
legislation. 124 Under the HIL instruments, the lender might argue that by su-
ing on the Note it could also avoid the borrower's reinstatement right. The
absence of any mention of the right to reinstate in the Note suggests this con-
struction. In addition, Mortgage Covenant 18 clearly is intended to apply pri-
marily to the foreclosure situation. In fact, if the borrower does have a right to
reinstate absent foreclosure, there is some difficulty in identifying just when
the right would end. In mortgage jurisdictions, the standard language pro-
vides that the borrower can reinstate at any time prior to entry of judgment
enforcing the Mortgage. In deed of trust jurisdictions, the right terminates on
quality, type, and class as to meet generally the purchase standards imposed by private institu-
tional mortgage investors." 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1) (Supp. III 1976). See Randolph, supra note 1,
at 548.
120. The acceleration provision is a critical element of the contract to loan and should be set
forth on the face of the note evidencing that contract. In some jurisdictions, failure to set forth the
acceleration rights in the note even when the mortgage contains an acceleration clause will deprive
the secured lender of any action based upon the accelerated note. E.H. & J.A. Meadows Co. v.
Bryan, 195 N.C. 398, 142 S.E. 487 (1928). The majority rule, however, is that the presence of an
acceleration clause in the mortgage will suffice. Note, Bills and Notes-Acceleration Clause in
Mortgage as Affecting Maturity of Notes---Distribution of Proceeds of Foreclosure Sale, 9 N.C.L.
Rev. 201, 202 (1931).
121. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 18.
122. The instrument, however, is written in commendably straightforward and clear prose.
123. See note 133 infra.
124. See note 95 supra.
[Vol. 60
1982] UNIFORM HOME IMPROVEMENT LOAN NOTE 391
a lawsuit to enforce the deed of trust or a short period prior to the private sale,
whichever is applicable. 125 If the right to reinstate were available when there
was no suit to foreclose, it logically would be available up to the entry of the
judgment in the suit on the Note, since the judgment would provide the same
basis for collection of the accelerated debt. Although this is a logical inference
of how the right ought to apply, a suit on the Note is not a suit to enforce a
mortgage, and the language of Covenant 18 would not apply precisely.
Notwithstanding these construction problems, there is language in the in-
struments that supports the interpretation that reinstatement is always avail-
able. This result, indeed, appears to have been the construction intended by
the drafters. The standard language in the last sentence of Mortgage Cove-
nant 18 suggests that reinstatement is available to reverse the acceleration of
the debt, not just to avoid foreclosure:
Upon such payment and cure by Borrower, this Mortgage and the
obligations secured hereby shall remain in full force and effect as if no
acceleration had occurred.
126
Further, Note Paragraph 5 refers to the Mortgage language for informa-
tion concerning "how and under what conditions I may be required to make
immediate payment in full of all the amounts that I owe under this Note."' 2 7
In light of this language, the borrower can argue that the Mortgage modifies
the lender's rights under the Note by establishing the "conditions" under
which acceleration will be effective. In the HIL program, the Mortgage Cor-
poration will seek foreclosure in virtually every case, making this issue rele-
vant only to interpreting the lender's rights when it has used the HIL
instruments for loans in its own portfolio.
VI. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 5: THIs NOTE SECURED
BY A DEED OF TRUST
12 8
This Paragraph simply refers to the Mortgage securing the Note. Al-
though, strictly speaking, the Mortgage will stand as security even if not re-
ferred to in the Note, 129 it makes sense to include the reference. Further, the
spirit of the plain language instrument requires a disclosure of the relationship
between the instruments. For this reason,130 the drafters included the second
125. See N.C. Deed of Trust, infra Appendix B, Covenant 18.
126. See id. ("Deed of Trust" substituted for "Mortgage") (emphasis added).
127. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 5.
128. See id.
129. See Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, at 315-16, and authorities cited therein.
130. An additional reason to incorporate the Mortgage acceleration provisions is to safeguard
the mortgagee's right to rely upon the more extensive mortgage acceleration rights in a suit for the
debt or for a deficiency. Some jurisdictions require that the note contain its own acceleration
clause in order for the mortgagee to recover an accelerated claim outside of foreclosure. See note
120 supra. The HIL mortgage acceleration clause is the only basis for an acceleration for defaults
such as due on sale violations, sufferance of prior liens, failure to pay monies into escrow accounts
and numerous other borrower defaults for which the lender would surely wish to accelerate, fore-
close and, where necessary, recover a deficiency judgment.
A provocative recent opinion in Illinois suggests that the "reference over" technique in the
HIL Note, and indeed in virtually all note forms commonly used, may be inadequate. 2140 Lin-
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sentence of the Paragraph indicating that the Mortgage contains additional
information with respect to the lender's acceleration rights. This language
placed the drafters on the horns of a dilemma in certain jurisdictions. Al-
though it is clear that mere reference to a mortgage securing a note does not
destroy the negotiability of the note,131 there was some doubt as to whether
negotiability was affected when the note went on to describe (and inferentially
incorporate) certain provisions of the mortgage, such as acceleration rights.
The general rule, of course, is that a negotiable note must stand by itself and
not incorporate any other provisions by reference. 132 A 1962 amendment to
U.C.C. section 3-105 (1)(c) made clear that mere reference to the acceleration
provisions of the mortgage will not affect negotiability. 133 There are, however,
several jurisdictions134 that have not yet adopted the recent amendments, and
in those jurisdictions the second sentence of Covenant 5 was deleted.
VII. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 6: BORROWER'S PAYMENTS BEFORE
THEY ARE DUE
135
Paragraph 6 permits prepayment at any time without penalty, but (in
most jurisdictions) reserves to the lender some control over time and manner
of prepayment. The issue of prepayment rights proved to be controversial
from several standpoints. The prepayment penalty historically has been one
of the major battle grounds of consumer interests. A substantial portion of the
testimony taken in the series of "public meetings" in 1971, when the FNMA
and the Mortgage Corporation first introduced their uniform one-four family
instrument forms, attacked the prepayment penalties contained in those
forms. 13 6 In 1979 FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation elected to eliminate
the prepayment penalty from all their one-four family loan instruments. The
HIL drafters, already in the midst of their drafting efforts, followed this policy
decision.
Comments from lenders on the HIL exposure drafts (with Note Para-
coln Park West v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 88 IlL. App. 3d 660, 410 N.E.2d 990 (1980)
(due-on-sale clause unenforceable unless set forth on face of note). But see Licata, 2140 Lincoln
Park West: Bad News for Mortgage Lenders, 63 Chi. B. Rec. 16 (1980), arguing that the case
actually turns upon subtle phrasing of the note form involved in that case, which phrasing can be
avoided by future drafters. The court's opinion does not set forth the note language, which incor-
porated the trust deed provisions by referring to "accruals of the right to foreclose' rather than to
"defaults." Mr. Licata argues that the court would have permitted incorporation of the due-on-
sale clause by reference if the reference language had used the term "defaults."
131. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(c), (2)(a). See id. § 3-105, Official Comments 3 & 8.
132. Id. § 3-104(1)(b).
133. Id. § 3-105(l)(c). Comment 8 was amended earlier than the statute to the same effect.
134. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.03.105(3) (1980); Ga. Code § 109A-3-105(1)(c) (1975); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 3-105(l)(c) (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 3-105(1)(c) (1971); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 73.1050(1)(c) (1979); and R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-3-105(l)(c) (1970).
135. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 6.
136. Critics of the prepayment penalty included Senators Tunney and Proxmire. FNMA Pub-
lic Meeting, supra note 109, at 173 (statement of Sen. John Tunney); id. at 34 (statement of Sen.
William Proxmire). Virtually every lending industry representative who spoke at any length dur-
ing the public meeting defended the prepayment penalty as fair and necessary. See, e.g., id. at 44,
125, 184 (statements of Lewis S. Eaton, Roy Blount and Paul G. Basner, respectively).
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graph 6 in its present form) indicated that many felt that a prepayment penalty
was a valuable protection against "portfolio raiding" in the event of an interest
rate downturn. They desired prepayment penalty provisions in their own loan
portfolios, and thus would have been uncomfortable originating loans on the
FNMA/FHLMC forms if these forms did not contain them. To resolve this
problem, among others, HIL lenders may wish to attach riders to the instru-
ments setting up special contract rights and obligations between the original
parties. The Corporation's Sellers' Manual requires that these riders be appli-
cable only until the loan is transferred in whole or in part to the Corpora-
tion. 137 The Corporation expects that some sellers will take advantage of this
provision to establish their own prepayment penalty provisions. The few sell-
ers who retain substantial participations in loans sold to the Corporation, how-
ever, will be unable to charge prepayment penalties for their retained portions.
Lenders should be wary of using accounting methods for partial prepay-
ments that effectively result in prepayment penalties. For instance, computing
per diem interest on a 360-day year, but charging it on a 31 day month, can
result in extra benefit to the lender upon prepayment that is, at least arguably,
a "penalty" to the borrower. Similarly, if a lender should receive a prepay-
ment but not credit it against principal until the next payment date, the bor-
rower arguably again suffers a "penalty." Neither of these devices is permitted
by the HIL Servicers' Manual,138 but it is important to keep in mind that they
are also inconsistent with the terms of Note Paragraph 6, which permits pre-
payments of principal "at any time... without paying any penalty" (subject
to lender's controls discussed below). Thus lenders who originate loans for
their own portfolio using the HIL Note instrument may have to modify their
internal prepayment accounting practices if they have not already done so in
the preparation for sale of loans to the Corporation.
The standard Note language, used in most jurisdictions, provides that the
lender may impose certain restrictions on prepayment in order to facilitate its
accounting. First, it may limit prepayment to the same day that an installment
payment would otherwise be due. Second, it may require that the amount of a
partial prepayment equal the principal amount in the next one or more
monthly payments. Last, the lender is not required to modify the payment
schedule in the event of a partial prepayment. All of these provisions may
have obvious advantages to lenders managing loan portfolios with established
payment schedules. The provisions are included for the benefit of the
lender/servicer, and are not required by the Corporation, which simply re-
quires that its share of prepayments be accepted 139 and that no penalty be
charged to the borrower.
14°
The provision for restricting prepayment is one instance in which the
drafters deliberately included contract language that is potentially at odds
137. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at § 2.208b(iii).
138. Servicers' Manual, supra note 66, at §§ 2.105, .106.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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with controlling laws in jurisdictions for which the forms were designed.141
This uniform paragraph was drafted to be consistent with the rights of feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan institutions. Under the preemptive1 42 regula-
tions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, these institutions may charge
moderate prepayment penalties. Even if the optional restrictions permitted in
Note Paragraph 6 could be construed as violative of a state law prohibition of
prepayment penalties, the federal savings and loans would nevertheless be
able to impose the restrictions.1 43 It should also be noted that typical state
consumer legislation prohibiting prepayment penalties tends to be somewhat
limited in application. For instance, U.C.C.C. statutes typically apply only
when interest rates on the loan exceed a certain minimum. 144 Although in
1980 mortgage loan rates were generally in excess of the "trigger rate" for
most U.C.C.C. statutes, this has not been the case normally. Further, some
U.C.C.C. states raised their "trigger rate" in response to inflation.' 45 If the
Corporation's HIL program proves successful, it will be buying loans at rates
that are lower than typical consumer loans. Therefore, the U.C.C.C. may not
apply in some jurisdictions.
In West Virginia, which imposes penalties for violation of its usury
laws 46 and which also restricts the imposition of prepayment penalties under
141. At least twelve states restrict the use of prepayment penalties. See Randolph, supra note
I, at 556 n.38.
142. Id. at 587-90.
143. It should be noted that the federal regulations do not authorize unlimited prepayment
penalties. Penalties on owner-occupied residential property may not exceed six months interest
on the aggregate amount of all prepayments in any 12 month period which exceeds 20% of the
original principal amount of the loan. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-5(b) (1980). It would be extraordinary ifany "penalty" resulting from the use of the prepayment restraints in Note Paragraph 6 wouldexceed this limit.
144. Under the U.C.C.C. provisions in effect in most U.C.C.C. jurisdictions, typical institu-tional lenders are classified as unsupervised lenders and m ake real estate loans with interest
rates up to a stipulated rate without falling under the U.C.C.C. provisions. See generally 1 Cons.
Cred. Guide (CCH) I 5165 (1969). This stipulated rate, the "trigger rate," was originally set high
to exclude ordinary purchase money mortgages, but in most jurisdictions even the prevailing firstlien rate is in excess of the "trigger rate" and will bring the loan transaction within the U.C.C.C.
unless some special exemption has been enacted.
In Kansas, prior to 1980, the only way to make a loan at interest rate in excess of the rela-
tively restrictive usury laws was to make the loan under the U.C.C.C. The U.C.C.C. "trigger rate"
was actually in excess of the maximum under the usury laws (the Kansas U.C.C.C. rate had its
own, higher limits.). In 1980, the Kansas legislature adopted a usury ceiling indexed to the Mort-
gage Corporation's monthly purchase commitments. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-207(bo) (Supp. 1980).
The same legislation exempted real estate mortgage loans (including first lens and junior liens
held by the first lien holder from all of the provisions of the U.C.C.C. Kan. Stat Ann. § 16a-l-
301(14)(b) (Supp. 1980), and preempted the federal Monetary Deregulation Act usury provisions
(12 U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7, note (Supp. 1981)). Kan Stat. Ann. § 16-207(a) (Supp. 1980). The KansasHIL instrument, substantially completed before this recent legislation, contains an optional state-
ment to the effect that the loan is made under the provisions of the U.C.C.C .As of ts writing, it
is unnecessary for the parties to make such an election of U.C.C.C. coverage in order to make a
loan at an adequate interest rate. Should the indexed interest ceiling descend, however, partiesmight want to take advantage of the relatively high fixed ceiling under the U.C.C.C. See generally
Comment, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Real Estate Financing-A Square Peg in a
Round Hole, 28 U. Kan. L. Rev. 601 (1980).
145. For a summary of the U.C.C.C. provisions in various states, showing "trigger rates" rang-
ing from 10% to 18%, see 1 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) D 505 (1969).
146. W. V. Code § 31-17-18 (1975).
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the usury laws, 147 the last sentence of Note Paragraph 6 was deleted. How-
ever, in many other jurisdictions where exercise of an option to restrict prepay-
ment would violate state law148 the sentence still appears in the uniform Note
form. The Corporation nevertheless requires a warranty that legal documents
used in the transaction conform to state law. 149 Thus, in jurisdictions in which
the restriction of prepayment would violate state law, a lender who is not oper-
ating under the federal regulations would be unable to establish policies lead-
ing to the imposition of any prepayment restrictions without violating its
warranty to the Corporation. After a sale to the Corporation, the Servicers'
Manual would control the relationship between the seller and the Corpora-
tion.150 The Servicers' Manual does not expressly prohibit the lender/servicer
from restricting prepayments, but it does require conduct consistent with
law.15 1 Lenders will have to make an independent determination as to
whether their jurisdiction permits separate restrictions upon prepayment.
VIII. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 7: BoRROwER's WAIVERS1
52
This provision is the drafters' best effort to turn the standard waiver of
rights to presentment, notice of dishonor and protest i5 3 into "plain language."
The U.C.C. clearly recognizes the effectiveness of such waivers. 154 The Para-
graph demonstrates the near impossibility of drafting technical legal language
in short, concise "plain language." For instance, it is not true, as the Para-
graph suggests, that "anyone... who agrees to keep the promises made [in the
Note] is known as a guarantor, surety and endorser." 155 Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of the Paragraph is clearer than standard "legalese," and will at least
apprise the consumer of legal issues for which he should seek legal advice if
questions arise.
Presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest, in any event, are defenses of
endorsers, not guarantors or non-endorsing sureties.156 Few, if any, consumer
borrowers will find themselves in the position of endorser of an HIL Note.'
57
147. Id. § 47-6-56(f).
148. See note 141 supra.
149. Sellers' Manual, supra note 9, at § 1.102s.
150. See Servicers' Manual, supra note 66, at Forew.
151. Id. § 2.106.
152. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 7.
153. For a discussion of these defenses, see White & Summers, supra note 38, at 506-09;
U.C.C. §§ 3-501 to -511.
154. U.C.C. § 3-511.
155. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 7 (emphasis added). The concept of "surety"
under the U.C.C. includes all persons liable for the debts of another, including all guarantors,
U.C.C. § 1-201(40), and all "accommodation parties," U.C.C. § 3-415, Comment 1. See generally
White & Summers, supra note 38, at 517-18. The concepts of guarantor and endorser, however,
are more limited and distinct from one another. See L. Simpson, Handbook on the Law of Sure-
tyship §§ 3-17 (1950). On the other hand, the obligations of an endorser who has made the waiv-
ers contained in Note Paragraph Seven and those of a guarantor are virtually identical. Id. § 16.
Similarly, guarantors and endorsers who validly waive their secondary liability (as Note Para-
graph Seven would have them do) are virtually identical to a surety.
156. See U.C.C. § 3-501.
157. There is a possibility that a relative or friend might guarantee the HIL Note by endorse-
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A mortgagor who transfers property to a grantee who assumes the mortgage is
a surety, 158 probably is not an accommodation party under the U.C.C.159 and
definitely is not an endorser.
Under the Mortgage Corporation's HIL program, originators of HILs will
transfer their rights to the Corporation with warranties but without endorse-
ment. They do not guarantee payments. The Corporation, most likely, will
guarantee payment to its purchasers, when there are purchasers, just as it does
in its first lien programs. But for the most part the Corporation will not "nego-
tiate" the paper representing the HIL loan rights to its purchasers and there-
fore will not become an endorser under the U.C.C. It is therefore difficult to
identify the target of the waiver language in Note Paragraph 7.160 In light of
the language's potential to lead borrowers erroneously to conclude that the
waivers have some impact upon them, and in light of the inherent ambiguities
contained in the "plain language" translation of the waivers, it might have
been best had the drafters eliminated them altogether.
161
IX. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 8: GIVING OF NOTICES 16 2
Paragraph 8 contains the notice provision. The lender may provide no-
tice either by certified mail or by personal delivery, while the borrower must
provide notice only by certified mail. The reason for this apparent imbalance
in notice rights is that lenders in some areas indicated concerns about the ef-
fectiveness of mail delivery. They stated that, notwithstanding the contrary
protestations of the United States Postal Service, mail carriers were either fail-
ing to deliver mail entirely in certain neighborhoods or delivering in such a
ment, rather than by some other means of expressing the guarantee. See White & Summers, supra
note 38, at 426. In such a case the waivers contained in Note Paragraph Seven may have some
relevance. Nevertheless, such an endorser also will have the defenses of an accomodation party
discussed resulting from a release, extension or suspension of the principal's obligation or an un-
justifiable impairment of the security. Id. The Corporation's HIL Sellers' and Servicers' Manuals
do not mention the possibility of guarantors, and thus neither prohibit their use nor consider them
relevant to the evaluation of the credit of the borrower.
158. That he is a surety is clearly established at common law. See Osborne & Nelson, supra
note 2, § 5.19. That he is entitled to suretyship defenses is inescapable under U.C.C. § 3-606. See
id., Comment 1; White & Summers, supra note 38, at 434 n.125. Note that the original mortgagor
has some suretyship defenses even when the transferee does not assume. Osborne & Nelson,
supra note 2, § 5.19.
159. "An accomodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose
of lending his name to another party to it." U.C.C. § 3-415(1). The mortgagor/transferor, though
he has signed the note, did so at a time when no transfer had occurred, so he did not sign for the
purpose of supporting the transferee's credit. See Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 833, 838 (1968).
160. Should the instruments ever be used for "dealer paper," of course, situations may arise in
which the dealer would endorse a note to a "take-out" lender. The Mortgage Corporation's HIL
program does not contemplate the use of "dealer paper." See note 21 and accompanying text
supra.
161. In the drafting of the next generation of uniform instruments, the Renegotiable Rate
Mortgage first lien one-to-four-family instrument (an early, and now obsolete, version of the vari-
able interest rate mortgages which the Bank Board has approved), the FNMA/FHLMC drafters
have responded to these concerns and have modified the scope and clarified the application of this
waiver language (copy on file in N.C.L. Rev. office). Subsequent uniform instruments undoubt-
edly will use the modified language.
162. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 8.
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way that communication with the borrower was not assured. These lenders
had resorted to the practice of using private delivery services for significant
notices, and wished to have that form of notice set forth in the instruments. In
addition, certain lenders argued that the most effective form of notice is one
delivered to the borrower during a conference in the lender's offices. Lenders
who relied upon delivery as their method of providing notice wanted the right
to personal delivery as an alternative to mail delivery in the instruments be-
cause of the potential confusion in the structuring of loan servicing practices if
the instruments provided only for mailed notice. The drafters did not feel it
was appropriate to include a parallel right to delivery notice on the part of the
borrower. The justifications for permitting the lender to deliver notice do not
necessarily apply in the borrower's case. In addition, lenders were concerned
that a notice delivered to the improper branch or department of their institu-
tion would not find its way to the proper desk as quickly as would a mailed
notice.
The most significant problems arising with respect to the notice provisions
relate to the Borrower's transfer of the property and foreclosure notices gener-
ally. These issues are discussed elsewhere. 163
X. HIL NOTE PARAGRAPH 9: RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS
UNDER THIS NOTE16 4
This Paragraph deals primarily with the rights of accommodation parties
to the Note.165 The substance of the Paragraph comes from language in the
first lien note which was inserted originally in the 1972 instrument to reflect
existing conservative practices. In fact, few first lien loans purchased by the
Corporation have involved accommodation parties, and the drafters antici-
pated that there would be few accommodation parties to the HIL Notes. The
bulk of the Paragraph thus should be of small significance in the HIL
program.
The language includes a "plain language" reiteration of the first lien note
provisions imposing joint and several liability upon accommodation parties.
The language also purports to bind any guarantor, surety or endorser to be
"fully and personally obligated" to perform the obligations contained in the
163. See Randolph, supra note 1, at 593-610.
164. See N.C. Note, infra Appendix A, Para. 9.
165. Under the U.C.C. accommodation parties are primarily guarantors and endorsers, not
original mortgagors who later transfer the property and become sureties. See note 159 supra.
Although the Note language later defines the responsibilities of "guarantors, sureties or endors-
ers," those terms are limited by the definitions set forth for them in Note Paragraph 6. Those
definitions do not include all possible types of sureties. They go beyond the U.C.C. concept of an
accommodation party in only one particular they apply to one who undertakes in a separate
writing to assure the performance of another under the Note, rather than by affixing his signature
to the Note. The difference between "accommodation parties" (makers and others who sign the
Note) and "guarantors" (potentially persons who do not sign the Note but guarantee it), leads to
some ambiguity as to the referent of the pronoun "us" as used in the Paragraph. The discussion
hereafter will assume that the Paragraph is designed to impose full personal liability upon anyone
who signs the Note in any capacity and anyone else who might accommodate the maker by a
separate writing.
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Note. This language raises the question whether such parties are to be prima-
rily liable as makers. It would be somewhat unusual for a note provision to
attempt to alter in this way the secondary liability of a party who has agreed to
become a guarantor or endorser of the note. 166 It does not appear that the
drafters really contemplated such an alteration. The questionable phrasing
resulted simply from an attempt to reiterate the technical language in the first
lien note stating: "this Note shall be the joint and several obligation of all
makers, sureties, or guarantors and endorsers .... ,,167 This technical lan-
guage in the first lien note made accommodation parties jointly and severally
liable amongst themselves, but did not purport to make them primarily liable
as makers. Provisions in other parts of the HIL Note and Mortgage extend the
rights of the lender against accommodation parties, but none go so far as to
impose primary personal liability upon the Note against all such parties. The
language of Note Paragraph 9 should not be so construed.
Since the Note already contains the standard waivers of the rights of en-
dorsers,168 the language of Paragraph 9 would appear to have very little addi-
tional impact, even if enforceable as written. 169 In fact, it is quite likely that
the attempt to make accommodation parties personally liable will expand their
rights because, if successful, it will make them, effectively, "borrowers." If
accommodation parties are "borrowers," then they would appear to have the
notice rights set forth in Paragraph 4 notwithstanding the waiver of notice of
dishonor set forth in Paragraph 7. Of course, the accommodation party would
at least have to supply a notice address to the lender in order to ensure that he
did receive notice. Accomodation parties probably would be entitled to notice
of the original borrower's default before the lender proceeded against the se-
curity. Accommodation parties also would have the right to reinstate even
though the right does not appear on the face of the Note. Since the borrower
has, by separate contract, obtained the right to reinstate, such right arguably
166. If one signs and adds the phrase "payment guaranteed," or equivalent language, then one
might assume primary liability. U.C.C. § 3-416(1). The phrase "collection guaranteed," on the
other hand, means something different. Basically the signor expects the holder of the note to
pursue other security upon default before seeking him. U.C.C. § 3-416(2). In neither case would
it necessarily be appropriate to conclude that the signor has waived any available suretyship de-
fenses under U.C.C. § 3-606.
Even when the accommodation party admittedly is liable directly and personally insofar as
the holder is concerned, he still has a right against the accommodated party which the holder may
not frustrate. If the holder should grant an extension of the secured debt, thereby arguably frus-
trating the right of the surety/accommodation party to protect his position, the common law-and
U.C.C. § 3-606(l)-release the surety from all or part of his obligations. See generally Randolph,
supra note I, at 577-80. Typically a negotiable instrument to which there may be accommodation
parties would include language preserving the lender's rights against sureties, notwithstanding the
'release rule," as permitted by U.C.C. § 3-606(2). Because there is such small likelihood of sure-
tyship issues arising under the HIL instruments, the drafters omitted this language. For the same
reason, they did not include or authorize language waiving statutory or common law suretyship
rights such as the Pain v. Packard rule. See Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, § 5.9, at 264; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1641 (1956).
167. First Lien Note, supra note 12.
168. See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra.
169. When an accommodation party uses words of guarantee instead of simply endorsing, he
loses the rights of presentment, notice of dishonor and protest by that circumstance. U.C.C. § 3-
416(5).
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should be available to persons whom the lender seeks to charge as, effectively,
co-borrowers.
At another point in the Paragraph, the attempt to articulate technical le-
gal concepts in plain language again creates some ambiguity with respect to
the rights of the parties. The Paragraph states that "any person who takes over
my [borrower's] rights or obligations under this Note will have all of my rights
and must keep all of my promises made in the Note." This is apparently a
plain language statement of the concept that persons assuming obligations
under the Note will be treated as if they were the original maker insofar as the
lender's rights are concerned. The plain language translation blurs the distinc-
tion between a simple assumption of an obligation and a novation. 170 The
borrower may conclude from this language that someone who buys his prop-
erty and assumes the obligations under the Note171 has actually "taken over"
the borrower's obligations so that the borrower is no longer bound. This is
unfortunate because many institutional consumer loan officers, in this author's
experience, make the same error and likely will not be in a position to clarify
the borrower's understanding of the situation. Of course, the drafters did not
intend this result unless there is a true novation and the lender expressly re-
leases the first borrower in writing. The Corporation expects that most trans-
fers of the property will result in novations or new loans. 172 This is also the
intent of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations on the issue.
173
Many lenders, unfortunately, have adopted practices that do not lead to the
borrower's release. Thus, a borrower who believes he is released when he sells
his property to a grantee who assumes the loan may be mistaken. Needless to
say, the older, more technical, language did not make the difference between
assumption and novation any clearer for the borrower, but some would argue
that intelligibility to the layperson was not the function of that language. In-
telligibility is a goal of the plain language Note.
The language of the Paragraph goes on to make cosignors (and others
170. In a simple assumption of a mortgage loan obligation, the assuming party (normally the
transferee of the title to the mortgaged property) agrees to be primarily responsible on the loan as
between himself and the original borrower. The original borrower remains fully liable to the
mortgagee but now can look to the assuming party for recourse if the loan goes unpaid. In such
cases, the lender typically is viewed as obtaining additional rights against the assuming party, if
for no other reason than to avoid circuity of action. Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, § 5.10-.18.
A novation is a three-way agreement among the original borrower, transferee and mortgagor
whereby the mortgagor releases the original borrower entirely and, in effect, makes a new contract
with the transferee. See Storke & Sears, Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 38 Corn. L. Q. 185, 188
(1953).
A third type of transfer of mortgaged property is commonly known as a transfer "subject to"
a loan. In these cases, the transferee takes the property encumbered by the mortgage but assumes
no personal liability to pay a deficiency judgement should the property be insufficient to cover the
debt in the event of default. Whether the transferee can look to his transferor for recourse due to
loss of the property in the event of foreclosure depends upon the terms of the transfer. In the
typical case the terms would provide no such right. Osborne & Nelson, supra note 2, §§ 5.3, .9.
171. Either directly or indirectly, the transferee of an HIL Note likely will become an "assum-
ing grantee" if there is no novation. See discussions of Mortgage Covenants 11 and 16, Randolph,
supra note 1, at 580-82, 601-05.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 164.
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who are personally liable) jointly and severally liable. Such language is stan-
dard fare for debt instruments. Finally, the Paragraph purports to extend the
personal, joint and several liability imposed upon accommodation parties to
their assignees. The effectiveness of this language, of course, stands or falls
with the issue of the extent to which accommodation parties are liable in the
first instance. In any event, it seems superfluous, since one who "takes over"
(to use the Note terms) the rights or obligations of another takes them as he
finds them even if there is no language to this effect in the document creating
the underlying obligation.
XI. CONCLUSION: THE HIL IN NORTH CAROLINA
Although North Carolina extensively regulates consumer lending prac-
tices, most of these regulations will have virtually no impact on the HIL pro-
gram. The North Carolina Consumer Finance Act 174 requires that consumer
lenders obtain licenses before doing business in the state.175 Licensees are se-
verely limited in their lending practices, but are permitted to lend at rates in
excess of those available under the general usury laws. 176 The Act identifies
several specific classes of loans, and sets different requirements for each. The
most general class of loans appears to be loans described in section 53-173 of
the Act, loans with maximum principal amounts of $3,000.177 Loans made
under this section are severely limited as to collection terms178 and may not be
secured by real estate. 179 Under section 53-176 of the Act, °80 however, licen-
sees apparently may make loans secured by security interests other than first
liens in real property 1'8 in "installments not exceeding $5,000, '"182 carrying
interest not to exceed fifteen percent.'8 3 Licensees making loans under section
53-176 may not make loans under other provisions of the Act.' 84 The Con-
174. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
175. Id. § 53-168.
176. Id. § 53-173(a) limits the principal amount that licensees may lend to $3000 and sets a
maximum interest rate of 3% per month on the first $300 and I 1h% per month on the balance up to
$3000. These rates, although phrased as maximums, actually are higher than the general usury
statute, which is set at a floating rate with a maximum of 12% for loans of less than $25,000. Id.
§ 24-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
177. Id. § 53-173(a).
178. Id. § 53-173 itself limits interest on maturity and sets the method for computing charges.
Id. § 53-180 limits use of due-on-sale and due-on-insecurity clauses and provisions for attorneys'
fees. Practices may be further limited by regulations of the Commissioner of Banks. Id. § 53-185.
179. Id. § 53-180(0.
180. Id. § 53-176.
181. Id. Junior security in real estate apparently is acceptable, since the statute prohibits only
first liens and does not fall under the specific prohibition on any real estate liens articulated in
§ 53-180(f).
182. Id. § 53-176. A recent amendment to sections 53-172 and -180 limits non-commercial
loans by licensees under the Act to $25,000. Law of May 28, 1981, ch. 464, §§ 2, 3, 1981 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 498.
183. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-176 (1975). When drafted, this rate was an attractive interest rate.
Now, however, the rate may be lower than that authorized under the "floating usury rate" provi-
sions for junior lien mortgages set forth in id. § 24-1.2(3) (see note 190 infra) or the preemptive
floating rate for insured lenders permitted by the Deregulation Act, supra note 42. See note 46
and accompanying text supra.
184. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-176 (1975).
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sumer Finance Act, however, exempts from its terms most established institu-
tional lenders, including almost any lender which would be likely to
participate in the HIL program or similar programs with FNMA or the Mort-
gage Corporation. 1
85
Another chapter of North Carolina law, the Retail Installment Sales
Act, 186 applies to credit advances to secure the price of goods and services
provided by the creditor.187 Again the terms of the credit arrangements are
rigidly controlled. Although these provisions may apply to particular home
improvement loans when the transactions involve contractor financing, they
will have no impact on the Mortgage Corporations's HIL program because the
Corporation will not buy "dealer paper" in this pilot program. The HIL in-
struments themselves may be used by parties to transactions falling under the
Retail Installment Sales Act, of course. In the event the instruments are so
used, counsel should be careful to conform the provisions of the instruments to
meet the limitations imposed by this Chapter.
Article Two of Chapter 24 of the North Carolina General Statutes188 ap-
plies specifically to "secondary or junior mortgages" that secure debts in prin-
cipal amounts not more than $25,000 and payable in equal monthly
installments over a period of no more than 181 months. 18 9 The apparent pur-
pose of this Article was to provide more generous usury limitations than
would otherwise have applied. 190 At one time, this Article also contained cer-
tain limitations on provisions in the loan contracts,191 but these limitations
were repealed in 1979.192 The Article contains a usury limitation that is a bit
more permissive than would otherwise apply under the federal usury standard
contained in the Federal Monetary Policy Deregulation and Control Act, 193
and therefore may be of some benefit to some HIL lenders. Loans made by
most institutional lenders likely to participate in HIL programs with the Mort-
gage Corporation, however, are exempted from the coverage of these statutes
as well. 19
4
Deeds of Trust used in the HIL program will be subject to the provisions
of Chapter 45 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which control the fore-
185. Id. § 53-191.
186. Id. §§ 25A-1 to -45 (Cum. Supp. 1979 & Interim. Supp. 1980).
187. Id. §§ 25A-1, -2 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
188. Id. §§ 24-12 to -17 (Cum. Supp. 1979 & Interim Supp. 1980).
189. Id. § 24-12(2), (3) (Interim Supp. 1980).
190. Id. § 24-14, revised in 1979, set the interest maximum for loans under the statute at the
higher 1113% per month or 5% over the "Federal Discount Rate" (not defined). After more recent
amendments this rate does not appear to be higher than that approved for junior lien installment
loans generally under the recent revisions to section 24-1.2. Law of May 28, 1981, ch. 464, § 1,
1981 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 498 (sliding scale based upon U.S. Treasury bill's six month rate plus
six percent, with minimum of 16%).
191. See Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1229, § 2(24-15), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1792, as amended by
Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 698, § 3, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 844, limiting late charges and requiring
certain rebates on renewal.
192. Law of June 23, 1980, ch. 1157, § 7, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 90.
193. See notes 46 & 190 and accompanying text supra.
194. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Loans made by licensees under the Con-
sumer Finance Act also are exempted under § 24-16.1.
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closure process, but little in this Chapter addresses directly the issues raised by
the HIL note. It might be noted, however, that section 45-80, apparently
designed to facilitate the use of notes with adjustable interest rate provisions,
applies only to first lien instruments, and would not be useful to HIL
lenders. 195
Recent comprehensive revision of the statutes relating to state savings and
loan associations 96 gives such lenders extensive power to lend on leaseholds
and junior security. In any event the legislation specifically gives state savings
and loan associations the same lending authority and the same interest rate
flexibility provided to federal savings and loan associations. 197 Although this
legislation apparently authorizes variable interest rate loans to the extent per-
mitted by Bank Board regulations, the provision on interest rates is not en-
tirely clear on this point.
198
State commercial banks are authorized generally to make secured or un-
secured loans. 199 Such lenders would be subject to the higher of (1) the fed-
eral "floating interest rate" for loans other than first lien residential loans,
2°°
or (2) North Carolina section 24-1.1(2) which sets another floating rate.
20'
Neither state savings and loans or state commercial banks appear to be subject
to any specialized consumer legislation other than (for banks) the usury laws.
Regulations of the Savings and Loan Division or the Banking Commissioner,
as now or later authorized and promulgated, might contain some restrictions
on lending practices.
In sum, despite a variety of potentially restrictive statutes, the North Car-
olina Legislature has seen fit to leave the major lending institutions in North
Carolina with an "open market place" to negotiate loans on terms and condi-
tions they find appropriate. The legislative decision mirrors the prevailing at-
titude in many states that lending institutions do business in a sufficiently
competitive environment and possess sufficient social responsibility to insure
basic fairness in their loan transactions.
The HIL loan program tests whether this permissive attitude on the part
of the North Carolina Legislature and other state legislatures is justified. In
general, consumers are fairly treated under all FNMA and Mortgage Corpora-
tion programs, the HIL program included. But the careful analyst will draw a
distinction between the programs themselves and the instruments which repre-
195. See id. § 45-80 (Interim Supp. 1980).
196. See Law of April 30, 1981, ch. 282, 1981 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (to be codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 54B-1 to -262).
197. Law of April 30, 1981, ch. 282, § 3 (54B-195, -196), 1981 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (to be
codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54B-195, -196).
198. The new law states that any association may contract for interest at any rate permitted by
federal law. Id. § 3 (54B-190) (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 54B-190). Whether the term
"rate" would be read to include variable rates is unclear, particularly in light of the specific autho-
rizations for variable rate first lien loans authorized in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-80 (Interim Supp.
1980).
199. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 53-43(1) (1975) (banks have power of "loaning money on personal
security or real and personal property").
200. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
201. See note 190 supra.
[Vol. 60
1982] UNIFORM HOME IMPRO VEMENT LOAN NOTE 403
sent the ultimate statement of the consumer's rights. The instruments must be
evaluated on the "worst case" basis, as the consumer borrower has little, if
any, control over whether the lender will choose to enforce the very letter of
the contract provisions. Judged by this standard, the instruments contain sev-
eral relatively harsh and arguably unjustified provisions favoring the lender in
the event of a dispute. Notice periods are extremely short,20 2 the borrower's
rights are spelled out with a far less clarity than the lender's 20 3 and the instru-
ments, because of the requirement of uniformity, occasionally appear to pro-
vide the lender with greater rights than it might really have under state law.
2 °4
All of these deficiencies may force consumers to be less forthright in asserting
their interests if and when disputes arise during the loan term.
On the positive side, the uniform instruments probably are superior from
the consumer's standpoint than most typical home improvement loan instru-
ments now in use. They do provide for actual notice prior to acceleration, and
apparently they permit the borrower to avoid acceleration merely by making
up back payments. Further, the instruments spell out the essence of the con-
tract relationship in clear, readable prose. In light of the needs of FNMA and
the Mortgage Corporation to respond to their primary constituencies-
lender/sellers, investors, and repurchasers-the secondary market makers
have done a creditworthy job in looking after America's consumers. Although
consumers may have little choice as to the language in the loan contract, they
do, of course, have the choice not to take out a loan at all. Most will find that
the HIL program will offer fewer risks and greater benefits than other loan
programs for major home improvements. The benefits the secondary market
will provide in the rates and terms for home improvements loans will lead
most consumers to applaud FNMA and the Mortgage Corporation for their
efforts to bring the national money market into the home repair business.
202. See notes 112-114 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 120-123 and accompanying text supra.
204. See note 107 supra. Because there are few limitations on the practices of most major
North Carolina lenders, this criticism is less valid in the North Carolina context.
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APPENDIX AINOTEI
_19._ _ North Carolina
City
Properly.4ddress City State Zip Code
1. BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PAY
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U.S. $.
(this amount will be called "principal"), plus interest, to the order of the Lender. The Lender is
I understand that the Lender may transfer this
Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this
Note will be called the "Note Holder."
2. INTEREST
I will pay interest at a yearly rate of_ _ _
Interest will be charged on that part of principal which has not been paid. Interest will be charged begin.
ning on the date of this Note and continuing until the full amount of principal has been paid.
3. PAYMENTS
I will pay principal and interest by making payments each month of U.S. $
I will make my payments on the day of each month beginning on - 19 1 will
make these payments every month until I have paid all of the principal and interest and any other charges,
described below, that I may owe under this Note. If, on ,..............._, I still owe amounts
under this Note, I will pay all those amounts, in full, on that date.
I will make my monthly payments at
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder.
4. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED
(A) Late Charge for Overdue Payments
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any of my monthly payments by the end of
calendar days after the date it is due, I will pay a later charge to the Note Holder. The amount
of the charge will be % of my overdue payment, but not less than U.S. $
and not more than U.S. $ I will pay this late charge only once on any late payment.
(B) Notice From Note Holder
If I do not pay the full amount of each monthly payment on time, the Note Holder may send me a written
notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a certain date I will be in default. That date must
be at least 10 days after the date on which the notice is mailed to me or, if it is not mailed, 10 days after the date
on which it is delivered to me.
(C) Default
If I do not pay the overdue amount by the date stated in the notice described in (B) above, I will be in
default. If I am in default, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the full amount of principal
which has not been paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount.
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the Note Holder does not require me to pay immediately in full as
described above, the Note Holder will still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time.
(D) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and Expenses
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as described above, the Note Holder will
have the right to be paid back for all of its costs and expenses to the extent not prohibited by applicable law.
Those expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees.
5. THIS NOTE SECURED BY A DEED OF TRUST
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Deed of Trust, dated
_ 19.._._, protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep
the promises which I make in this Note. That Deed of Trust describes how and under what conditions I may be
required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts that I owe under this Note.
6. BORROWER'S PAYMENTS BEFORE THEY ARE DUE
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before they are due. A payment of principal
only is known as a "prepayment." When I make a prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in a letter that I am
doing so. A prepayment of all of the unpaid principal is known as a "full prepayment." A prepayment of only
part of the unpad principal is known as a "partial prepayment."
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I may make a full prepayment or a partial prepayment without paying any penalty. The Note Holder will
use all of my prepayments to reduce the amount of principal that I owe under this Note. If I make a partial
prepayment, there will be no delays in the due dates or changes in the amounts of my monthly payments unless
the Note Holder agrees in writing to those delays or changes. I may make a full prepayment at any time. If I
choose to make a partial prepayment, the Note Holder may require me to make the prepayment on the same
day that one of my monthly payments is due. The Note Holder may also require that the amount of my partial
prepayment be equal to the amount of principal that would have been part of my next one or monthly
payments.
7. BORROWER'S WAIVERS
I waive my rights to require the Note Holder to do certain things. Those things are: (A) to demand pay-
ment of amounts due (known as "presentment"); (B) to give notice that amounts due have not been paid (known
as "notice of dishonor"); (C) to obtain an official certification of nonpayment (known as a "protest"). Anyone
else who agrees to keep the promises made in this Note, or who agrees to make payments to the Note Holder if I
fail to keep my promises under this Note, or who signs this Note to transfer it to someone else also waives these
rights. These persons are known as "guarantors, sureties and endorsers."
8. GIVING OF NOTICES
Any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it by
certified mail addressed to me at the Property Address above. A notice will be delivered or mailed to me at a
different address if I give the Note Holder a notice of my different address.
Any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note will be given by mailing it by certified
mail to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3 above. A notice will be mailed to the Note Holder at a
different address if I am given a notice of that different address.
9. RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE
If more than one person signs this Note, each of us is fully and personally obligated to pay the full amount
owed and to keep all of the promises made in this Note. Any guarantor, surety, or endorser of this Note (as
described in Section 7 above) is also obligated to do these things. The Note Holder may enforce its rights under
this Note against each of us individually or against all of us together. This means that any one of us may be
required to pay all of the amounts owed under this Note. Any person who takes over my rights or obligations
under this Note will have all of my rights and must keep all ofmy promises made in this Note. Any person who
takes over the rights or obligations of a guarantor, surety, or endorser of this Note (as described in Section 7
above) is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note.
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APPENDIX B
[DEED OF TRUST
THIS DEED OF TRUST is made this day of
19......_, among the Grantor
(herein "Borrower"),
(herein "Trustee"), and the Beneficiary
, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of
whose address is
(herein "Lender").
BOR.ROWER, in consideration of the indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein created, irrevocably
grants and conveys to Trustee and Trustee's successors and assigns, in trust, with power of sale, the following
described property located in the County of_ _ State of North Carolina:
which has the address of
[Street] [City]
North Carolina (herein "Property Address");
[Zip Code]
To HAVE AND TO HOLD unto Trustee and Trustee's successors and assigns, forever, together with all the
improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, rights, appurtenances and rents
(subject however to the rights and authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply such rents), all of
which shall be deemed to be and remain a part of the property covered by this Deed of Trust; and all of the
foregoing, together with said property (or the leasehold estate if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) are herein-
after referred to as the "Property";
To SECURE to Lender the repayment of the indebtedness evidenced by Borrower's note dated
and extensions and renewals thereof (herein "Note"), in the principal sum of
U.S. $ , with interest thereon, providing for monthly installments of principal and
interest, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not sooner paid, due and payable on
the payment of all other sums, with interest thereon, advanced in accordance herewith to protect the security of
this Deed of Trust; and the performance of the covenants and agreements of Borrower herein contained,
Borrower covenants that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to
grant and convey the Property, and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record.
Borrower covenants that Borrower warrants and will defend generally the title to the Property against all claims
and demands, subject to encumbrances of record.
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
1. Payment of Principal and Interest. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal and interest
indebtedness evidenced by the Note and late charges as provided in the Note.
2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or a written waiver by Lender, Borrower
shall pay to Lender on the day monthly payments of prinicipal and interest are payable under the Note, until the
Note is paid in full, a sum (herein "Funds") equal to one-twelfth of the yearly taxes and asessmcnts (including
condominium and planned unit development assessments, if any) which may attain priority over this Deed of
Trust, and ground rents on the Property, if any, plus on-twelfth of yearly premium installments for hazard
insurance, plus one-twelfth of yearly premium installments for mortgage insurance, if any, all as reasonably
estimated initially and from time to time by Lender on the basis of assessments and bills and reasonable esti-
mates thereof. Borrower shall not be obligated to make such payments of Funds to Lender to the extent that
Borrower makes such payments to the holder of a prior mortgage or deed of trust if such holder is an institu-
tional lender.
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If Borrower pays Funds to Lender, the Funds shall be held in an institution the deposits or accounts of
which are insured or guaranteed by a Federal or state agency (including Lender if Lender is such an institution).
Lender shall apply the Funds to pay said taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents. Lender may
not charge for so holding and applying the Funds, analyzing said account or verifying and compiling said
assessments and bills, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law permits Lender to
make such a charge. Borrower and Lender may agree in writing at the time of execution of this Deed of Trust
that interest on the Funds shall be paid to Borrower, and unless such agreement is made or applicable law
ruires such interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the
unds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds showing credits and
debits to the Funds and the purpose for which each debit to the Funds was made. The Funds are pledged as
additional security for the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
If the amount ofthe Funds held by Lender, together with the future monthly installments of Funds payable
prior to the due dates of taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents, shall exceed the amount
required to pay said taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents as they fall due, such excess shall
be, at Borrower's option, either promptly repaid to Borrower or credited to Borrower on monthly installments of
Funds. If the amount of the Funds held by Lender shall not be sufficient to pay taxes, assessments, insurance
premiums and ground rents as they fall due, Borrower shall pay to Lender any amount necessary to make up the
deficiency in one or more payments as Lender may require.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower
any Funds held by Lender. If under paragraph 17 hereof the Property is sold or the Property is otherwise
acquired by Lender, Lender shall apply, no later than immediately prior to the sale of the Property or its
acquisition by Lender, any Funds held by Lender at the time of application as a credit against the sums secured
by this Deed of Trust.
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender
under the Note and paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall be applied by Lender first in payment of amounts payable
to Lender by Borrower under paragraph 2 hereof, then to interest payable on the Note, and then to the principal
of the Note.
4. Prior Mortgages and Deeds of Trust; Charges; Liens. Borrower shall perform all of Borrower's obli-
gations under any mortgage, deed of trust or other security agreement with a lien which has priority over this
Deed of Trust, including Borrower's covenants to make payments when due. Borrower shall pay or cause to be
paid all taxes, assessments and other charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property which may
attain a priority over this Deed of Trust, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any.
5. Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the
Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage", and such other
hazards as Lender may require and in such amounts and for such period as Lender may require.
The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to approval by Lender,
provided, that such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. All insurance policies and renewals thereof
shall be in a form acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause in favor of and in a form
acceptable to Lender. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals thereof, subject to the terms
of any mortgage, deed of trust or other security agreement with a lien which has priority over this Deed of Trust.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may
make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower.
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days from
the date notice is mailed by Lender to Borrower that the insurance carrier offers to settle a claim for insurance
benefits, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the insurance proceeds at Lender's option either to restoration
or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
6. Preservation and Maintenance of Property, Leaseholds; Condominiums; Planned Unit Developments.
Borrower shall keep the Property in good repair and shall not commit waste or permit impairment or deteriora-
tion of the Property and shall comply with the provisions of any lease if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold. If
this Deed of Trust is on a unit in a condominium or a planned unit development, Borrower shall perform all of
Borrower's obligations under the declaration or covenants creating or governing the condominium or planned
unit development, the by-laws and regulations of the condominium or planned unit development, and constitu-
ent documents.
7. Protection of Lender's Security. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained
in this Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is commenced which materially affects Lender's interest in
the Property, then Lender, at Lender's option, upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances, disburse
such sums, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and take such action as is necessary to protect Lender's interest.
If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Deed of Trust, Bor-
rower shall pay the premiums required to maintain such insurance in effect until such time as the requirement
for such insurance terminates in accordance with Borrower's and Lender's written agreement or applicable law.
Any amounts disbursed by Lender pursuant to this paragraph 7, with interest thereon, at the Note rate,
shall become additional indebtedness of Borrower secured by this Deed of Trust. Unless Borrower and Lender
agree to other terms of payment, such amounts shall be payable upon notice from Lender to Borrower request-
ing payment thereof. Nothing contained in this paragraph 7 shall require Lender to incur any expense or take
any action hereunder.
8. Inspection. Lender may make or cause to be made reasonable entries upon and inspections of the
Property, provided that Lender shall give Borrower notice prior to any such inspection specifying reasonable
cause therefor related to Lender's interest in the Property.
9. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connec-
tion with an condemnation or other taking of the Property, or part thereof, or for conveyance in lieu of condem-
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nation, are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender, subject to the terms of any mortgage, deed of trust or
other security agreement with a lien which has priority over this Deed of Trust.
10. Borrower Not Released, Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment or
modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust granted by Lender to any successor in
interest of Borrower shall not operate to release, in any manner, the liability of the original Borrower and
Borrower's successors in interest. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against such successor
or refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured by this Deed of
Trust by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower and Borrower's successors in interest. Any
forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy hereunder, or otherwise afforded by applicable law,
shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any such right or remedy.
11. Successors and Assigns Bound- Joint and Several Liability, Co-signers. The covenants and agree-
ments herein contained shall bind, and the rights hereunder shall inure to, the respective successors and assigns
of Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 16 hereof. All covenants and agreements of
Borrower shall be joint and several. Any Borrower who co-signs this Deed of Trust, but does not execute the
Note, (a) is co-signing this Deed of Trust only to grant and convey that Borrower's interest in the Property to
Trustee under the terms of this Deed of Trust, (b) is not personally liable on the Note or under this Deed of
Trust, and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower hereunder may agree to extend, modify, forbear, or
make any other accommodations with regard to the terms of this Deed of Trust or the Note, without that
Borrower's consent and without releasing that Borrower or modifying this Deed of Trust as to that Borrower's
interest in the Property.
12. Notice. Except for any notice required under applicable law to be given in another manner, (a) any
notice to Borrower provided for in this Deed of Trust shall be given by delivering it or by mailing such notice by
certified mail addressed to Borrower at the Property Address or at such other address as Borrower may desig-
nate by notice to Lender as provided herein, and (b) any notice to Lender shall be given by certified mail to
Lender's address stated herein or to such other address as Lender may designate by notice to Borrower as
provided herein. Any notice provided for in this Deed of Trust shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower
or Lender when given in the manner designated herein.
13. Governing Law;, Severability. The state and local laws applicable to his Deed of Trust shall be the
laws of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. The foregoing sentence shall not limit the applicability
of Federal law to this Deed of Trust. In the event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or the Note
conflicts with applicable law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Deed of Trust or the Note
which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, and to this end the provisions of this Deed of Trust
and the Note are declared to be severable. As used herein, "costs", "expenses" and "attorneys' fees" include all
sums to the extent not prohibited by applicable law or limited herein.
14. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be furnished a conformed copy of the Note and of this Deed of
Trust at the time of execution or after recordation hereof.
15. Rehabilitation Loan Agreement. Borrower shall fulfill all of Borrower's obligations under any home
rehabilitation, improvement, repair, or other loan agreement which Borrower enters into with Lender. Lender,
at Lender's option, may require Borrower to execute and deliver to Lender, in a form acceptable to Lender, an
assignment of any rights, claims or defenses which Borrower may have against parties who supply labor, materi-
als or services in connection with improvements made to the Property.
16. Transfer of the Property. If Borrower sells or transfers all or any part of the Property or an interest
therein, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) a transfer by
devise, descent, or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant, or (c) the grant of any leasehold interest
of three years or less not containing an option to purchase, Borrower shall cause to be submitted information
required by Lender to evaluate the transferee as ifa new loan were being made to the transferee. Borrower will
continue to be obligated under the Note and this Deed of Trust unless releases Borrower in writing.
If Lender, on the basis of any information obtained regarding the transferee, reasonably determines that
Lender's security may be impaired, or that there is an unacceptable likelihood of a breach of any convenant or
agreement in this Deed of Trust, or if the required information is not submitted, Lender may declare all of the
sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and payable. If Lender exercises such option to
accelerate, Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration in accordance with paragraph 12 hereof. Such
notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed or delivered within
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of
such period, Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permitted by
paragraph 17 hereof.
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
17. Acceleration; Remedies. Except as provided in paragraph 16 hereof, upon Borrower's breach of any
covenant or agreement of Borrower in this Deed of Trust, including the covenants to pay when due any sums
secured by this Deed of Trust, Lender prior to acceleration shall give notice to Borrower as provided In para-
graph 12 hereof specifying- (1) the breach; (2) the action required to cure such breach; (3) a date, not less than
10 days from the date the notice is mailed to Borrower, by which such breach must be cured; and (4) that falure
to cure such breach on or before the date specified In the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured
by this Deed of Trust and sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate
after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the nonexistence of a default or any other
defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the breach Is not cured on or before the date specified in the
notice, Lender, at Lender's option, may declare all of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately
due and payable without further demand and may invoke the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by
applicable law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all reasonable costs and expenses Incurred In pursuing the
remedies provided in this paragraph 17.
If Lender invokes the power of sale, and if it is determined in a hearing held in accordance with applicable
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law that Trustees can proceed to sale, Trustee shall take such action regarding notice of sale and shall give such
notices to Borrower and to other persons as applicable law may require. After the lapse of such time as may be
required by applicable law and after the publication of the notice of sale, Trustee,without demand on Borrower,
shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms desig-
nated In the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in such order as Trustees may determine. Lender or
Lender's designee may purchase the Property at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property so sold without any covenant
or warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of
the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order:. (a) to all
reasonable costs and expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, Trustees fees of_ percent
(___%) of the gross sale price and costs of title evidence; (b) to all sums secured by this Deed of Trust; and
(c) the excess, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
18. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. Notwithstanding Lender's acceleration of the sums secured by this
Deed of Trust, due to Borrower's breach, Borrower shall have the right to have an proceedings begun by Lender
to enforce this Deed of Trust discontinued at any time prior to the earlier to occur of(i) the fifth day before sale
of the Property pursuant to the power of sale contained in this Deed of Trust or (ii) entry of a judgment enforc-
ing this Deed of Trust if. (a) Borrower pays Lender all sums which would be then due under this Deed of Trust
and the Note had no acceleration occurred; (b) Borrower cures all breaches of any other covenants or agree-
ments of Borrower contained in this Deed of Trust; (c) Borrower pays all reasonable expenses incurred by
Lender and Trustee in enforcing the convenants and agreements of Borrower contained in this Deed of Trust,
and in enforcing Lender's and Trustees remedies as provided in paragraph 17 hereof, including, but not limited
to, reasonable attorneys' fees; and (d) Borrower takes such action as Lender may reasonably require to assure
that the lien of this Deed of Trust, Lender's interest in the Property and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust shall continue unimpaired. Upon such payment and cure by Borrower, this Deed
of Trust and the obligations secured hereby shall remain in full force and effect as if no acceleration had
occurred.
19. Assignment of Rents; Appointment of Receiver, Lender in Possession. As additional security hereun-
der, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property, provided that Borrower shall, prior to accelera-
tion under paragraph 17 hereof or abandonment of the Property, have the right to collect and retain such rents
as they become due and payable.
Upon acceleration under paragraph 17 hereof or abandonment of the Property, Lender, in person, by agent
or by judicially appointed receiver shall be entitled to enter upon, take possession of and manage the Property
and to collect the rents of the Property including those past due. All rents collected by Lender or the receiver
shall be applied first to payment of the costs of management of the Property and collection of rents, including,
but not limited to, receiver's fees, premiums on receiver's bonds and reasonable attorneys' fees, and then to the
sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender and the receiver shall be liable to account only for those rents
actually received.
20. Release. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust, Lender or Trustee shall cancel this
Deed of Trust without charge to Borrower. If Trustee is requested to release this Deed of Trust, all notes
evidencing indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust shall be surrendered to Trustee. Borrower shall pay all
costs of recordation, if any.
21. Substitute Trustee. Lender may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor trustee to
any Trustee appointed hereunder by an instrument recorded in the county in which this Deed of Trust is re-
corded. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and duties
conferred upon the Trustee herein and by applicable law.
REQUEST FOR NOTICE OF DEFAULT
AND FORECLOSURE UNDER SUPERIOR
MORTGAGES OR DEEDS OF TRUST
Borrower and Lender request the holder of any mortgage, deed of trust or other encumbrance with a lien
which has priority over this Deed of Trust to give Notice to Lender, at Lender's address set forth on page one of
this Deed of Trust, of any default under the superior encumbrance and of any sale or other foreclosure action.





STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, County ss:
I, , a Notary Public of the County of__
State ofNorth Carolina, do hereby certify that
personally appeared before me this day and acknowledged the due execution of the foregoing
instrument.
Witness may hand and official seal this day of I_9.._
My Commission expires:
Notary Public
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, County ss:
The foregoing certificate of , a Notary Public of the County of
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, State of__ _ is certified to be correct.
This _ day of ,19
Registrar of Deeds
Probate fee € paid. By
Deputy Assistant
(Space Below This Line Reserved For Lender and Recorder)
